Royal v. Dennison

California Supreme Court Oct 3, 1894 No. No. 19,482Published

Before: Haynes

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Holding. A party to a contract for the exchange of real property is not required to accept a conveyance from a third-party stranger to the contract, particularly when the title offered is encumbered by fraudulent conveyances and judgment liens.

Issues

Whether a party to a real estate exchange contract can be compelled to accept a deed from a third party who is a stranger to the contract.
Whether a party who has divested themselves of title through a fraudulent conveyance can enforce specific performance of an exchange agreement.
Whether judgment liens against a property title justify a party's refusal to accept that title in an exchange.

Disposition. affirmed

Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion

“The burden or obligation of each to make the conveyance may, however, be transferred or performed by another only with the consent of the party who is to receive such performance or conveyance.”

Synopsis

Vendor and Vendee—Deed from Stranger.—One to whom a person has agreed to convey land is entitled to a deed from such person, and need not accept a deed from a stranger to the contract.1

Exchange of Lands,—Where, in a Contract for the Exchange of land, the values of the respective parcels have been fixed, a party to the contract, who had no title to the land he contracted to convey, and who has placed himself in such a position that he cannot acquire title, cannot object to the tender of the deed by the other party because made on condition that he pay the amount fixed by the contract as the value of the land to be conveyed by him.

Ejectment—Judgment-roll as Evidence.—In Ejectment, Where defendant claims that plaintiff agreed to convey him the land in exchange for other land, the judgment-roll in a creditors’ action against defendant to have a deed by him of his land declared void is admis sible to show that defendant is unable to convey his land.

HAYNES, C. In ejectment to recover possession of a certain house and lot in the city of Los Angeles. The answer, after denying the averments of the complaint, for a separate answer and equitable defense alleged, in substance, that in August, 1887, the defendant G. L. Dennison purchased the demanded premises from the plaintiff, and as the consideration thereof agreed to convey to the plaintiff four certain lots in or near the city of Pasadena, and prior to the commencement of the action had tendered to plaintiff a deed for said lots, and demanded from plaintiff a deed of the demanded premises, and prayed for a specific performance of the agreement. The action was tried by the court. Findings were duly filed, and judgment for the plaintiff was entered thereon, and this appeal is by the defendants from the judgment and an order denying their motion for a new trial.

The findings are very full, and cannot be inserted in this opinion, but an outline of the facts found may be thus stated: In August or September, 1887, the plaintiff and the defendant G. L. Dennison made a verbal agreement whereby plaintiff agreed to sell to Dennison a house and lot on Courthouse street in the city of Los Angeles, at a valuation of $4,000, [853]to be paid for by the conveyance of four lots in “Dennison’s subdivision of Pair Oaks Avenue Park tract in the Rancho San Pasqual,” said lots to be taken at a valuation of $1,000 each. Dennison shortly afterward went into possession of the house and lot. At the time of the agreement the survey and subdivision of Dennison’s land had not been completed, but in January, 1888, plaintiff selected and marked upon the map the four lots described in the answer. No time was ever agreed upon when the mutual conveyances were to be made. At the time said agreement of exchange was made G. L. Dennison did not have title to said four lots, but held a contract of purchase of a larger tract of which they were a part, upon, which he had made one payment, and was to obtain a deed only upon full payment; that he never made any other payment, but on October 30, 1888, conveyed all his right, title and interest in said premises to Lucius Dennison, who afterward—but at what date does not appear, except that it was prior to July 8, 1890—procured title to the tract of which these lots were a part; that between December, 1887, and the last of May, 1889, the plaintiff obtained from G. L. Dennison $750 as loans, to be secured on said lots; that on July 8, 1890, plaintiff tendered to defendant G. L. Dennison a good and sufficient deed of conveyance of the house and lot, and demanded of Dennison payment of $3,250, being the agreed value of the property, less $750, the amount of said loans. Dennison refused to make such payment, and at the same time tendered to plaintiff a deed of conveyance of said four lots, executed by Lucius Dennison, but which deed the plaintiff refused to accept, the grantor therein being a stranger to the contract or agreement between plaintiff and G. L. Dennison. It was further found that on May 6. 1890, a judgment was rendered in the superior court of Los Angeles county against G. L. Dennison for $20; that on September 25, 1890, one Marriner obtained a money judgment in said court against said G. L. Dennison for $2,500; that on December 28, 1888, F. K. and O. M. Harriman foreclosed in said court a certain mortgage against said G. L. Dennison, and on March 29,1889, a deficiency, judgment therein was docketed against said Dennison for $2,174.55; that on September 27, 1890, in an action brought by said Harrimans in said court against said G. L. Dennison and Lucius Dennison, a decree

Royal v. Dennison

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