McHarry v. Stewart
Before: Garoutte, Harrison, Haynes, Paterson
Synopsis
Homestead—Right of Widow to Convey Homestead.—Code of Civil Procedure, section 1468, provides that, if deceased left also a minor child or children, one-half the real estate of which deceased died seised shall “belong” to his widow and the remainder to the child or children. Section 1485 provides that persons succeeding to the title of “successors to homesteads” have all the rights of the persons whose interests they acquire. Held, that a wife, having minor children by a former, deceased husband, could convey to her second husband a certain sixty acres of one hundred and seventy-five acres of land which were set apart to her and her children as a homestead out of the lands of her deceased husband.
Public Land—Homestead—Partition.—Code of Civil Procedure, Section 764, provides that when it appears, in an action of partition, that one or more of the tenants in common has conveyed in fee to another person a specific part of the common land, the land so conveyed shall be allotted in partition to such purchaser, etc., if such tract can be so allotted without material injury to the other cotenants. Held, that such purchaser’s right to file upon an, “adjoining farm homestead” under Revised Statutes of the United States, sections 2289, 2290, cannot be defeated by the possibility that, on the partition, other land not adjoining that filed upon may be allotted him, instead of the specific part conveyed to him.
Public Land—Determination of Pre-emption Rights.—Revised Statutes of the United States, section 2273, provides that all questions as to the right of pre-emption, arising between different settlers, shall be determined by the register and receiver of the district within which the land is situated, and for “appeals from the decision of the district officers.” Held, that, in the absence of any statute limiting the power of the commissioner of the land office and Secretary of the Interior on appeal, the power will not be denied to the commissioner and secretary to decide questions arising on evidence, which were not decided by such district officers.
Public Land—Contest.—Where the Secretary of the Interior, in a land contest, decided on the evidence that the residence of a claimant of land as an “adjoining farm homestead,” under Revised Statutes of the United States, sections 2289, 2290, on his own land adjoining the tract claimed, was not such as to entitle him to such tract, the supreme court of California has no jurisdiction to review such question in ejectment against such claimant by one claiming the same land under the pre-emption laws of the United States.
HAYNES, C. The complaint is in ejectment, in the usual form, and the plaintiff’s title is evidenced by a patent from the United States. Defendant answered, denying all the allegations of the complaint except that alleging defendant’s possession, and filed a cross-complaint setting out facts upon which he claims that plaintiff should be adjudged a trustee of the legal title for his benefit, and be required to convey the same to him. Plaintiff’s demurrer to the cross-complaint was sustained, and judgment thereon, as well as upon the issues raised by defendant’s answer, which were tried by the court, was rendered against the defendant, who now appeals from the judgment; and the only question presented is as to the sufficiency of the cross-complaint.
On December 10, 1883, the defendant filed upon the demanded premises as an “adjoining farm homestead,” under sections 2289 and 2290, Revised Statutes of the United States, defendant then claiming to be the owner" of about sixty acres of adjoining lands, upon which he resided. On December 13th of the same year, the plaintiff, claiming a residence upon a subdivision of government lands adjoining the demanded premises, filed a pre-emption claim including the demanded premises. Upon these conflicting claims, a contest arose before the local land office, and testimony was taken. The cross-complaint sets out the facts which defendant claims were proven upon the hearing, and, by exhibits attached thereto, sets out the decision of the register and receiver thereon, the decision of the commissioner of the general land office upon appeal, the decision of the Secretary of the Interior upon appeal from the commissioner, and also the decision of the secretary upon a petition for review. The land which defendant claimed to own, and upon which he claimed to reside at the [410]time he filed upon the demanded premises, was formerly a part of the Pinole rancho, in which one James McClellan owned an undivided interest, which, after his marriage, was set off to him in that part of the rancho adjoining the demanded premises. McClellan died in December, 1871, leaving his widow, Getta, and two minor children, surviving him. In February, 1876, a homestead containing one hundred and seventy-five acres was set apart by the probate court, for the use of the widow and minor children, in that part of the land partitioned to McClellan which adjoined the demanded premises. Afterward, in March, 1876, the widow married the defendant, Stewart. On October 2, 1882, Mrs. Stewart conveyed to her husband (the defendant) a portion of the homestead, containing about sixty acres, adjoining the demanded premises, the children being still minors. Upon these facts, and without considering the other evidence before them, the register and receiver held that defendant acquired no right or title by his purchase from his wife, and therefore was.not entitled to an “adjoining farm homestead” under the statute, and awarded the land to McHarry. On appeal to the commissioner, this decision was reversed, and the land was awarded to Stewart; and, upon appeal to the secretary, the commissioner’s decision was reversed, and the land again awarded to McHarry. The evidence taken before the register and receiver principally related to two points, viz., Stewart’s ownership and title to the land conveyed to him by his wife, and his residence thereon. It is conceded that, after Stewart filed upon the demanded premises, his residence was principally at Martinez, where he had gone into business. He claimed, however, that he left the land in consequence of assaults made upon him by the Mc-Harrys and threats which put him in fear. The register and receiver did not pass upon this evidence, but rested their decision solely upon want of title to the adjoining lands, while the commissioner held his title sufficient, and that his absence from the land was excused by the acts of McHarry. The secretary held against Stewart on both points. So far as questions of fact are concerned, all courts are bound by the decision of the land department, unless such decision has been obtained by fraud or imposition. In this case we find nothing to justify a review of questions of fact: Shanklin v. McNamara, 87 Cal. 371, 26 Pac. 345; Lee v. Johnson, 116 U. S. 48, 29 L. Ed.
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