Shirley v. Board of Trustees of Cottonwood School District

BELCHER, C. This is an appeal by the defendants from a judgment awarding the plaintiff a peremptory writ of mandate, and the case is brought here for review on the judgment-roll. The court found the facts of the case to be in substance as follows: In July, 1890, the defendants were the duly elected, qualified, and acting trustees, and constituted the board of trustees of Cottonwood school district in San Benito county. The plaintiff was a duly qualified school teacher and on July 1, 1890, was employed by the defendants to teach the pupils of the Cottonwood school for the term of four months, commencing on the fourteenth day of that month. She was to receive, and agreed to accept, for her services $60 per month, payable monthly by orders drawn by the board on the county superintendent of schools. At the time named she entered upon the performance of her duties as such teacher, and continued to teach the school until August 23d, a period of six weeks, when the defendants, as such board of trustees, [606]wrongfully and without cause discharged and dismissed her from the school, and prevented her thereafter from teaching the school, and completing her part of the contract. She was ready, willing, able, and competent to teach the school and complete her contract, and repeatedly offered to do so, but the defendants, as such board of trustees, prohibited and prevented her from occupying the schoolhouse and teaching the school after the 23 d of August. On August 23d, a majority of the board proposed to her that she teach the school two weeks longer, if at the end of the two weeks she would resign her place as teacher. She assented to this proposition, but demanded as a condition of her resignation that she be paid her salary for the full term of four months. The board refused to pay the full amount, but drew an order in her favor for the sum of $90, the same being in full payment for the time she had already taught. “No demand was made by plaintiff on defendants after the expiration of said four months, nor was any demand for the full term’s salary made by her, other than as a condition for her resignation, as above set forth, and such demand was made on August 23, 1890.” “Said discharge of plaintiff was for the alleged cause of incompetency as a teacher, and for cruel and unusual punishment of a pupil, but plaintiff was during all of said time competent as a teacher, and performed and fulfilled her duties properly as such, and did not punish said child either in a cruel or unusual manner, nor for any purpose except for just cause, and to a moderate extent, but said board of trustees in discharging plaintiff acted under the honest belief that plaintiff had punished the child excessively, and in a cruel and unusual manner.” The court further found that the sum of $150 was due the plaintiff, and unpaid, for the balance of her salary under her contract, and as conclusions of law: ‘ ‘ That plaintiff by the wrongful acts of defendants in ignoring the contract, and expelling plaintiff from said school, was exonerated from making formal demand for the issuance of an order on the superintendent of schools. That plaintiff is entitled to the peremptory writ of mandate compelling defendants, as said board of trustees, to issue to plaintiff the order upon the said superintendent of schools of San Benito county for the sum of one hundred and fifty dollars, but without costs.” Judgment was accordingly so