Heilbron v. Campbell

WORKS, J. This is an application by the petitioners against the respondent, as judge of the superior court of the county of Fresno, to prevent him from proceeding further in an action pending in said court, in which Charlotte F. Clarke et al. are plaintiffs and the petitioners are defendants. The petition shows, in substance, that in 1880 an agreement was entered into by and between the petitioners' and one Jeremiah Clarke by which the petitioners leased from said Clarke, for a term of years, a certain tract of land in said county of Fresno, being a part of what is known as the “Laguna de Tache Rancho,” and in which agreement it was provided that the petitioners should have the option, during said lease, to purchase said property at the price and on the terms therein named; that the petitioners took possession of said property under said lease and contract, and complied with all its terms and conditions; that the said Charlotte F. Clarke, who was the wife of Jeremiah Clarke, made application for and procured letters of guardianship over the property of her said husband on the ground of his unsoundness of mind, and before the expiration of said lease, and before the time given the petitioners by said lease and contract to exercise their option to purchase said property, she, as such guardian, brought an action in said court to set aside said contract on the ground that said Clarke was at the time he executed the same of unsound mind that said cause was tried before the respondent as judge of said court, and findings and judgment rendered in favor of the plaintiff, and a motion for a new trial has been made, and is pending before the respondent; that a motion has also been made by said plaintiff far the appointment of a receiver to take charge of said property, which is also pending. As a reason why the respondent should be prohibited from acting-further in said cause, it is alleged that during the pendency thereof before bin he purchased a certificate of purchase for a certain tract of land, consisting of two hundred and fifty-seven acres, which is a part of the land included in said lease and contract, and of which the petitioners took and held possession thereunder, and a part of the land claimed fey each of [206]the parties in said action and in controversy between them, and that the respondent still holds and owns said certificate, and claims to own said property. There are also other allegations, not necessary for us to notice particularly. The respondent demurs to the petition, and also answers the same. In his answer he denies that the land purchased and claimed by him is a part of said ranch, but he does not deny that the parties to said action are claiming it to be a part thereof, or that the petitioners are in possession of it, claiming it to be within their contract, or that it is in controversy between the parties in said action.