White v. Douglass

SEARLS, C. This is an action to determine a contest between applicants for the purchase of land from the state of California, as provided for under sections 341J-3416 of the Political Code. The cause was tried by the court, a jury having been waived, and judgment was rendered upon written findings in favor of plaintiff!, from which, and from an order denying a new trial, defendant appeals. It is objected to the first finding of the court that the evidence shows without conflict that no purchase of the land described in the complaint, or any portion thereof, was made by plaintiff: from Pico, but that an agreement was made to purchase over one thousand acres of land, including the land in controversy, provided the claim of Pico to the Moquelemos grant was confirmed by the supreme court of the United States; that plaintiff was in [575]possession long before the date of sneh contract, and had improved the land prior thereto, and that neither his entry nor improvements were made under said contract. The finding of fact, standing by itself, seems liable to the criticism aimed at it, but when taken in connection with other facts, as found by the court, the reason of the objection fails.

The findings, as a whole, embody a history of plaintiff’s connection with the land, his acts of control over it, improvements made thereon, contracts for the purchase thereof from Andreas Pico, his failure to obtain title under such contract, the reason of such failure, and his subsequent application to purchase through the regents of the University of the State of California. For convenience, as we suppose, the findings are divided into nineteen sections, and numbered consecutively from 1 to 19, and a part of the subject matter which might with propriety have been included in No. 1 is embodied in No. 5, and the two findings, read together, properly state the facts dedueible from the evidence touching the attempted purchase from Pico. The fifth finding is in the following language: ‘ ‘ That in fact said purchase of said land by plaintiff from said Pico was a conditional one, and said Pico agreed in and by the agreement of purchase thereof to repay to plaintiff said sum of fifteen hundred and sixty dollars, in case the claim of said Pico to said land, as a part of said Mexican grant called ‘Moquelemos,’ should not be finally confirmed.”

Had this last finding been attached to the first, it would have met the objection aimed at the former. Separated from it, we cannot see that it loses its potency as a fact in the case.