People v. Wood

SHARPSTEIN, J. The exception to the rulings of the court, on- the defendant’s objections to the introduction of evidence of other independent transactions, between him and persons other than the prosecuting witness, similar in character to the one which constitutes the basis of the charge on which the defendant was tried and convicted, merit careful consideration.

The defendant was charged with larceny. Whether he was guilty depended on the character of a transaction between him and the prosecuting witness, by which the latter transferred the possession of a certain sum of money to the former. If it was the understanding of the parties that the property in the money, as well as the possession of it, should pass, the fraudulent acquisition and subsequent use of it would not constitute larceny. Proof that the defendant had obtained money from other persons by means similar to those which he employed to obtain it from the .prosecuting witness might tend to show that the defendant was a great knave, but would not tend to show that he did not obtain the property in the money, as well as the possession of it, by fraudulent means. The question is, Was it the understanding that the 'title to the money should pass? Was it borrowed, or received on deposit for a special purpose ? This depends on the understanding of the parties at the time of the actual transfer. Could the defendant be permitted to prove similar transactions between him and other persons, in which it was understood that the title as well as the .possession of the money passed? The court below very properly held that he could not. The understanding between him and persons other than the prosecuting witness, from whom he obtained money by means exactly similar [210]to those resorted to for obtaining it from the prosecuting witness, would not in- the least degree tend to prove what was the understanding between the defendant and the prosecuting witness. If the understanding was the same in each case, and was such as to make the obtaining and use of the money in each case larceny, it would simply result that a defendant might be proved to have committed a series of larcenies, although charged with the commission of only one. For obvious reasons the law will not permit that to be done. “To admit evidence of such collateral acts would be to oppress the party implicated by trying him on a case as to which he has no notice to prepare, and sometimes by prejudicing the jury against him by publishing offenses, of which, even if guilty, he may have long since repented, or may have long since been condoned. Trials would, by this process, be injuriously prolonged, the real issue obscured, and the verdicts taken on side issues”: 1 Wharton on Evidence, 29.