Rice v. Boyd
Before: McKee
Synopsis
Dedication.—When More Than Six Years have Run from the beginning of a public user of land up to the bringing of suit by the owner, the court is justified in inferring a dedication on the day such user began.
Dedication—Revocability.—Neither the Owner' of Land nor Anyone claiming under him can recall a dedication once made and accepted, so long as the land remains in the use to which it was dedicated, although, subject to the user, the owner has the fee notwithstanding the dedication.
McKEE, J. The question in this case is, whether a strip of land about sixty feet wide on the southerly side of ten acre lot number 164 of the lands of the Southern California Association, south of Riverside, is part of a public highway. .
It was admitted at the trial that the land was within the boundaries of the Jurupa ranch, that a patent to the ranch had been issued by the United States government on May 23, 1879, and that the plaintiff derived his title to the ten acre lot from the patentee. And the court found:
“1. That continuously and uninterruptedly from some time prior to February 15, 1876, until April, 1881, a road of sufficient width for the convenient use and travel of a wagon and teams was, and has been, used as a public highway, running easterly and westerly, along and near to the south side of the lot of land described in the pleadings as ten acre lot No. 164, south of Riverside, in this county, and said road was, at the commencement of this action, and during all the time complained of in the complaint, a public highway, and has never been abandoned or discontinued as such.
“2. That in April, 1881, and frequently since then, the plaintiff has interrupted the use of said road as a highway, and placed obstructions therein under claim that there did not [197]exist any public highway across his said premises, and that the defendant, as road overseer of the district in which the road was situated, entered upon the strip of land in controversy as part of the highway for the purpose of making needed repairs thereon, and not otherwise. ’ ’
No attack is made upon the findings. The prominent fact then, as found by the court, and with which we have to deal, is user of the land as part of a public highway. It is well settled that adverse occupancy and use of land as a public highway, for a period of time equal to that prescribed by the statute of limitations for bringing ejectment, will justify the presumption of a dedication to the public: Cincinnati v. White, 6 Pet. (U. S.) 431, 8 L. Ed. 452; Onstott v. Murray, 22 Iowa, 459; Geberling v. Wunnerberg, 51 Iowa, 125, 49 N. W. 861; Reed v. Northfield, 13 Pick. (Mass.) 94, 23 Am. Dec. 662; San Francisco v. Scott, 4 Cal. 114; Harding v. Jasper, 14 Cal. 642. Here the' user commenced on the 15th of February, 1876, was acquiesced in by the owner and enjoyed by the public, uninterruptedly, until April, 1881, and the suit was not commenced until May 15, 1882; more than six years had therefore run from the commencement of the user until the bringing of the suit, and the court was justifiable in inferring that the owner of the land had dedicated it to public use on the 16th of February, 1876.
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