Butts v. State Bar

THE COURT. The State Bar charged petitioner with three acts of professional' misconduct, violative of sections 6067, 6068, 6103 ánd 6106 of the State Bar Act, all committed in connection with his employment as an attorney by Janette Mack.

The local administrative committee concluded that petitioner should be subjected to discipline for only one of the acts charged, that of wrongfully withholding $252.75 contrary to an alleged fiduciary obligation, and recommended that petitioner be suspended from practice for a period, of three months. With a slight modification of the committee’s findings to show that petitioner had repaid the sum subsequent to the issuance of the notice to show cause, the board of governors, by an eight to six vote, adopted the committee’s findings and recommendation. The six members based their negative vote on the ground that the degree of discipline recommended was too severe.

The matter comes before this court on a petition for writ of review. Petitioner contends that he has not committed any act of moral turpitude or dishonesty and that in any event the degree of punishment suggested is not justified by the facts in evidence.

The pertinent facts as found by the committee are these: Petitioner was admitted to practice in 1941. About January, 1946, Robert W. Mack and his wife Janette separated and the husband commenced an action for divorce in Los Angeles County. Mrs. Mack employed petitioner to represent her in the matter. A property settlement agreement was executed by the spouses, but prior to the date set for

[455]trial of the divorce suit, and about June, 1946, the parties became reconciled. In August, they again separated and a new property settlement agreement was prepared by petitioner and executed by them.

This latter agreement, among other things, provided for the immediate payment to the wife of $1,000 and for delivery by the husband, concurrently with the execution of the agreement, of a check for an additional $1,000 made payable to both petitioner and the wife. The additional sum was to be delivered by petitioner to the wife pursuant to the terms of a trust receipt. This receipt was signed by petitioner on November 4, 1946. It stated, after acknowledging receipt of $1,000 which had been paid to petitioner on September 16th, the following:

“The undersigned agrees to deposit said check to his Trustee Account and to hold the funds represented thereby intact, subject to the fulfillment of the following express provisions: