Rittenhouse v. Superior Court
Before: Curtis, Houser
Opinion — Curtis
CURTIS, J. Petition for a writ of prohibition directed to the Superior Court of the State of California, in and for the County of Los Angeles, to restrain said court from trying a certain criminal action therein pending against petitioner, or from making any order or taking jurisdiction in said action except to dismiss said case.
Petitioner was charged in the indictment with the crime of bribery in violation of section 68 of the Penal Code. Said indictment contained 61 counts, each of which was in the same language excepting as to dates. Petitioner during the entire time embraced within the accusations of said indictment was a deputy sheriff of the county of Los Angeles, and it was charged in Count One of said indictment that defendant on the 26th day of September, 1938, “did wilfully, unlawfully, corruptly, knowingly and feloniously, ask, receive, and agree to receive of and from John B. Osborne, a bribe, to-wit: the sum of One Hundred Dollars ($100.00), lawful money of the United States, for the purpose of corruptly influencing the action of said defendant, CHABLES BITTENHOUSE, and upon an agreement and understanding that the action of said defendant, CHABLES BITTENHOUSE, upon a matter then and there pending, and which was then and there before, and which might be brought before said defendant, CHABLES BITTENHOUSE, in his official capacity, to-wit, the arrest of the said John B. Osborne, and his agents and employees, for violations and a violation of various subdivisions of Section 337a of the Penal Code of the State of California, should be unlawfully and corruptly influenced thereby, said defendant, CHABLES BITTENHOUSE, being then and there an executive officer, to-wit, a duly appointed, commissioned and acting Deputy Sheriff of the County of Los Angeles, State of California.”
Bespondent filed a demurrer and answer to said petition. In view of the conclusion which we have reached, the issues raised by the answer become immaterial.
The indictment was returned on May 28, 1941. Prior [73]thereto and on May 14, 1941, petitioner, in response to a subpoena issued and served on him, testified before the grand jury of said county in an investigation then being made by said grand jury. In his petition for said writ petitioner has set forth certain matter occurring before the grand jury on the occasion of his appearance as a witness before that body and has made the reporter’s transcript of his testimony taken at that time a part of his said petition. It is petitioner’s contention that at said session of the grand jury he testified to matters concerning gaming in the county of Los Angeles, and particularly with reference to gaming at a place operated by one John R. Osborne in the so-called West Hollywood strip, which is not within the limits of any city and is therefore under the police jurisdiction of the county of Los Angeles. He accordingly claims that he was given statutory immunity under section 334 of the Penal Code, " and that such statutory immunity has removed the jurisdiction of said superior court to try the petitioner on the charge on which he was indicted.”
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