Autry v. Patteson

GIBSON, J. This is an action to quiet title to real property and to enjoin sale of the same under a decree of foreclosure of mechanics’ liens. In order to understand the issue presented here, it is necessary to review certain prior proceedings. Lottie L. Ewing and her husband made a note to J. Scharer and wife, secured by a mortgage on real property located in Sonoma County and known as the Pitch Mountain Tavern. The Ewings conveyed the property to Pitch Mountain Development Company, a corporation, which erected certain improvements thereon. Thereafter, the Scharers brought suit to foreclose the mortgage, and subsequent to the commencement of that action the Healdsburg Lumber Company and William Henry Chaney brought separate actioñs to foreclose mechanics’ liens resulting from the improvements referred to. By stipulation, the three actions were consolidated and tried together. In the consolidated action, the court rendered a decree which directed a foreclosure of the mortgage and sale of the property, and having determined that the lien of the mortgage was superior and senior to the mechanics’ liens, directed foreclosure of the mechanics’ liens subject and subservient to the lien of the mortgage. The property was sold under the mortgage foreclosure decree to the Scharers and, there being no redemp[725]tion, a commissioner’s deed was executed to the Scharers, as grantees, who later conveyed to the plaintiffs, W. A. Autry and May C. Autry.

Thereafter, Joseph D. Cox, as trustee in bankruptcy of the estate of William Henry Chaney, sued to renew the mechanic’s lien judgment and to foreclose and sell the property included in that judgment. An order of sale was issued and the sheriff advertised the property for sale, whereupon the plaintiffs, the purchasers of the title resulting from the mortgage foreclosure, brought this action to quiet title to the property and enjoin its proposed sale. The suit of Cox was brought upon the theory that the mortgage covered only a portion of the property which was subject to the mechanics’ liens, that the additional property did not pass to the purchasers at the mortgage foreclosure sale, and that therefore it could be reached by the mechanic’s lien claimants. The trial court in the present action found that the property involved in the mortgage, the conveyance, and the foreclosure actions, was the same, and rendered judgment for the plaintiffs. The defendants appealed.

The appellants contend that the mortgage foreclosure decree describes lands not contained in the mortgage, that the land described in the mortgage limits the power of the court to act in the foreclosure suit, and that the decree covering land wholly outside the mortgage is void. The respondents do not dispute the propositions of law presented by appellants, but they claim that the description in the mortgage was uncertain and that the court in the foreclosure action determined the scope of the description and the extent of the land to be affected by the decree. They further contend that since this decree has become final, the present collateral attack upon it must fail.