Irons v. State Bar

THE COURT. By this proceeding, a review is sought of the recommendation by the Board of Governors of The State Bar, of petitioner’s suspension for a period of eighteen months from the practice of the law within this state.

By the terms of the notice that was given to petitioner to show cause why he “should not be disciplined for professional misconduct”, in substance, the ultimate facts which purportedly constituted such asserted misconduct were set forth, together with the allegation that “All of said acts so committed by you during the course of your relations as an attorney and counsellor at law involve moral turpitude and dishonesty within the meaning of subdivision 5 of section 287 of the Code of Civil Procedure.”

On the part of the prosecution, briefly, the record establishes the existence of the following facts: In satisfaction of a [15]judgment in an action in which petitioner had represented one Lampe, petitioner was paid the sum of $250, of which amount, in accordance with an agreement between him and his client, petitioner was entitled to retain for his own use the sum of $83.33. Instead of paying to his client the remainder of the amount thus collected, by means of false and misleading statements made by petitioner to his client, he “stalled” for a period of five months, at the expiration of which time he was informed by his client that he knew of petitioner’s deception in the matter. Within a few days thereafter, petitioner paid to his client the amount to which he was entitled. In the meantime, the client had entered complaint of petitioner’s misconduct to the proper officials who represented The State Bar of California, with the result that about a month after petitioner had paid his client, he was served with the said notice to show cause why he should not be disciplined. At the time when petitioner paid the money to Lampe, petitioner had no knowledge that Lampe had complained of petitioner’s misconduct in the premises.

On the hearing of the notice to show cause, although petitioner admitted the truth of the foregoing statement, his defense thereto consisted of testimony given by him, which in part was corroborated by his law partner, to the effect that on the date when he received the said sum of $250, he deducted his fee therefrom and then placed the balance thereof in an envelope which he gave to his law partner, with the understanding then had between them that on the evening of that day he would deliver the envelope and the money to petitioner’s client; that the next day at about 3:30 o ’clock P. M., for the asserted reason that he had been unable to find his client, his partner returned the envelope to petitioner. Without any corroboration thereof, petitioner also testified that upon receipt of the envelope from his partner he had placed the envelope in a drawer in his roll-top desk, which he believed he thereupon locked; that petitioner had been engaged in court all of that day, but that on the day following, when he looked for the money that should have been in the envelope he discovered the fact that someone had taken it; that he registered no complaint with the police department regarding such theft; neither did he report to his client