In re L.A. Tr. Co.
Before: Angellotti
Synopsis
Change of Name—Disqualification of Judge—Order Fixing Time for Hearing—Regulation of Court Business.—A judge of the superior court, who is disqualified by reason of interest, under section 170 of the Code of Civil Procedure, to sit or act in a proceeding by a corporation for a change of its name, may make the order prescribed by section 1277 of that code, fixing the time of hearing the application and directing the giving of the requisite notice. Such action on the part of the disqualified judge relates solely to the arrangement of the calendar and the regulation of the order of business, within the meaning of the exception contained in section 170.
Id.—Sufficiency of Publication for Four Successive Weeks.—Where the petition for the change of name was filed on July 27, 1909, and the hearing set for August 24, 1909, a publication of a copy of the order in a newspaper on every day except Sunday from and including July 27, 1909, to and including August 23, 1909, is a compliance with the provisions of section 1277 of the Code of Civil Procedure, requiring such publication for four successive weeks.
Id.—Time of Publication How Computed.—In estimating the period of such publication, section 12 of the Code of Civil Procedure, providing for the exclusion of the first day and the inclusion of the last, is applicable.
Id.—Transfer from One Department of Superior Court to Another. —Under section 170 of the Code of Civil Procedure, in counties where there is more than one judge of the superior court, a disqualified judge may transfer the matter in which he is disqualified from his department to another department of the same court for hearing, instead of to the superior court of another county.n The provision of section 398 of that code, relating to a change to another county, is applicable only when all the judges of the county are disqualified, and when, as specified in subdivision 4 of section 397 of that code, there is no judge of the court qualified to act.
Id.—Hearing Contrary to Bule of Court—Notice of Trial.—The immediate hearing of the application for a change of name, by the judge to whom the matter had been transferred, in contravention of a rule of court requiring five days’ notice of trial, did not affect the jurisdiction, and in the present case the appellants’ rights appear not to have been prejudiced thereby.
Id.—Findings not Bequired in Change of Name Proceedings.—In a proceeding for change of name, formal findings of fact are not required. If such findings were essential, the recital in the order making the change should be taken as constituting such findings.
Id.—Allegation Showing Season for Change—Trust and Savings Bank.,—In a petition by the “Los Angeles Trust Company,” to change its name to the “Los Angeles Trust and Savings Bank,” an allegation that as the applicant proposed to conduct a savings bank department as well as a trust department, it believed that it would be to its advantage to have its name indicate that fact, for the better information of its customers and the general public, is a sufficient compliance with section 1276 of the Code of Civil Procedure, requiring the petition to specify the reasons for the change of name.
ANGELLOTTI, J. This is an appeal by the Los Angeles Savings Bank, a corporation, from an order of the superior court, granting an application of the Los Angeles Trust Company for authorization to change its name to “Los Angeles Trust & Savings Bank,” made under the provisions of sections 1275-1279 of the Code of- Civil Procedure. Appellant objected in the superior court to the granting of such application on the ground substantially that the proposed name so closely resembled its own name that it would tend to deceive the public as to the identity of the two corporations, with the result that it would be injured thereby.
The application of respondent, complying fully with the provisions of section 1276 of the Code of Civil Procedure, was filed with the clerk of the superior court of Los Angeles County during the forenoon of July 27, 1909, and an order was thereupon made by Judge Wilbur, one of the twelve judges of said court, directing all persons interested in said matter to appear in his department on August 24, 1909, at 10 o’clock a. M. to show cause why the application should not be granted, and directing publication for four consecutive weeks of a copy of the order in the Los Angeles Express, a newspaper of general circulation in the county published daily except Sunday. This paper was what is known as an evening paper, being published in the afternoon. The order to show cause was published therein from and including July 27, 1909, to and including August 23, 1909, as often as said paper was published, viz.: every day except Sunday. On [606]August 24, 1909, the matter came on for hearing before Judge Wilbur, respondent and appellant both appearing. Evidence on behalf of the parties was received, and on August 25, 1909, the matter was submitted for decision. On August 27, 1909, counsel for both parties attended at the judge’s chambers at his request, and were informed by him that by reason of certain facts that had come to his knowledge it was possible, that he was disqualified as matter of law to act as judge in such proceeding. Evidence was received upon the question of Judge Wilbur’s disqualification, and on September 2, 1909, Judge Wilbur ordered the matter transferred to department 11 of said court, presided over by Judge Willis, for further proceedings. On September 3, 1909, the matter was taken up before Judge Willis in department 11, both parties being present. Appellant objected to being compelled to proceed at once with the hearing, claiming that such procedure was in violation of a rule of the court requiring five days' notice and that it was not ready to proceed. Its objections were overruled and a hearing was then had de novo. There is no pretense that it did not produce all the evidence that it desired to present, or that it was at all injured by being compelled to proceed with the hearing on that day. In its order granting respondent’s application the trial court specifically found in favor of the allegations of respondent’s application, and against the allegations of appellant’s remonstrance. The facts in regard to the question of Judge Wilbur’s alleged disqualification were substantially as follows: There was . no pretense that there was any actual bias. Judge Wilbur and four other gentlemen were the trustees of a trust for charitable purposes known as the Hollenbeck Home, the property held by them as said trustees being certain land on a portion of which a home for indigent women and homeless children was to be erected, and twenty-five shares of stock in the First National Bank of Los Angeles. Certain of the directors of said national bank held in trust for the stockholders of said bank all of the stock of respondent trust company. The Hollenbeck Home trustees received no compensation and had no personal interest in the execution of their trust other than such interest as any person acting as a trustee of a charitable trust might have in its welfare.
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