Henning v. De Cora
Synopsis
Domicile of Minors—Death of Parents—Change of Domicile.—Minors whose parents were domiciled in this state at their death retain the domicile of their deceased parents until it is shown to have been changed by competent authority. The minors, as infants, are powerless to change their own domicile from one state to another.
Id.—Permission to Testamentary Guardian to Remove Minors from State—Retention of Jurisdiction—Presumption against Change of Domicile.—The jurisdiction of the superior court of this state over minors domiciled therein is not lost by an order permitting their testamentary guardian to remove them from the state until further order of the court. Such order implies the retention of jurisdiction over them, and it cannot he presumed that their domicile has been changed, or that their residence out of the state has become permanent, in the absence of evidence to show that it is otherwise than temporary.
Id.—Resignation of Testamentary Guardian—Minors Left Out of State—Jurisdiction to Appoint Succeeding Guardian.—Where the surviving testamentary guardian of the persons and estate of minors domiciled in this state, after an order permitting him to remove them to South Carolina until further order of the court, resigned his trust, and was discharged without further order of the court as to the minors, who were left in the state of South Carolina, the superior court of this state must be presumed to have jurisdiction to appoint a succeeding guardian both of the persons and estates of the minors, in the absence of proof of a change of their domicile or permanent residence by competent authority.
Id.—Failure to Order Return of Minors—Abandonment of Jurisdiction not Presumed.—The failure of the court to order the return of the minors to this state, when the testamentary guardian was discharged, creates no presumption that the court abandoned jurisdiction of the persons of the minors.
Id.—Right of Discharged Guardian to Contest Appointment—Non-return of Minors—Claim of Foreign Guardianship—Appeal.— Where the discharged testamentary guardian claimed an appointment as guardian of the minors by a court of competent jurisdiction in South Carolina, and was not ordered by the superior court to return the minors to California, and was served with notice of the application for the appointment of a succeeding guardian of their persons and estates, and appeared in opposition thereto, without objection, to contest the appointment of a guardian of the persons of the minors, it cannot be objected upon appeal that he had no right to contest the appointment, and ought not to be heard upon appeal, without first bringing the minors within the jurisdiction, he not being in default in that regard.
THE COURT. The matter is before us on an agreed statement of facts which respondent concedes are correctly sum[217]niarized in appellant’s brief, as follows: “In the year 1893 Clara Henning, the widowed mother of these minors, died testate in the city and county of San Francisco. By her last will, which was duly admitted to probate, she appointed George C. Shreve, of San Francisco, and David A. Henning, of the state of South Carolina, guardians of the persons and estates of these minors. Shreve and Henning accepted the trust and duly qualified October 30, 1893. On the first day of December, 1893, David A. Henning obtained an order of court permitting him to remove these minors to the residence of their grandparents, Isaac L. and Mary Henning, in the city of Sommerville, state of South Carolina, which was also the residence of said David A. Henning, there to remain until further order of court. The children were thereupon removed by their guardian to South Carolina, where they have ever since lived, either with their grandparents, or with their guardian, David A. Henning. In October, 1893, George C. Shreve died, and on the third day of August, 1894, David A. Henning filed his written resignation of his trust as guardian of the minors, and a petition for his discharge. On the fourteenth day of August, 1894, his resignation was accepted by the court, and an order made and filed settling his account and granting his discharge. This order made no provision as to the care, custody, or residence of these minors, and at the time when the order was made they were still living in South Carolina. On the seventeenth day of August, 1894, Mary E. De Cora, the respondent herein, filed a petition praying for her appointment as guardian of the persons and estates of these minors. The appellant answered this petition, denying that these minors were residents of the city and county of San Francisco. On the twenty-third day of March, 1897, an order was made granting the petition of respondent, and David A. Henning appeals to this court from so much of this order as appoints respondent guardian of the persons of these minors.” The children are aged ten and twelve years, respectively.
It should be added that, by order of the court, notice of the hearing of respondent’s petition was served upon Henning as well as the minors, and no question is raised as to the service. Henning appeared by answer and at the hearing by counsel.
[2181]
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