Casey v. Leggett
Before: Cooper
Synopsis
Fbaudulent Conveyance—Findings—Considebation— Sufficiency of Evidence—Review upon Appeal.—Where a conveyance by an insolvent debtor to his brother, antedating an attachment and execution sale of the interest of the debtor, was assailed as fraudulent by the execution purchaser, a finding that the conveyance was executed for a valuable consideration in payment of large indebtedness of the debtor to his brother, is sufficiently supported by their testimony to such consideration, if not contradicted or impeached otherwise than by its own weakness, though it may seem in some respects inherently improbable to the appellate court, which cannot substitute its opinion upon the weight of testimony for that of the trial court sitting as a jury to try the case.
Id.—Deliveby of Deed to Attobney of Geantbe.—A finding that ■the deed was delivered to the brother as grantee is sufficiently supported by testimony that it was drafted by his attorney at his request, and forwarded to the grantor for execution, and was returned to the attorney and held by him for the grantee after its execution.
Id.—Pbesumption of Title—Bubden of Pboof as to Fbaud.—The deed having been executed for a valuable consideration and delivered to the grantee, the law presumes that the title was rightfully acquired by him; and the burden of proof is upon the execution purchaser to show that it was conveyed with fraudulent intent on the part of the grantor, and that the grantee purchased with knowledge of such fraudulent intent, or under such circumstances as to put him upon inquiry as to the fraud of the grantor, and was not taken by him in good faith.
Id.—Goon Faith op Grantee—Support op Finding—Absence op Proop.—A finding in favor of the good faith of the grantee as a purchaser for value without notice of fraud on the part of the grantor, is supported by the absence, of proof of facts and circumstances putting him on inquiry as to such fraud.
Id.—Circumstantial Proop op Fraud—Suspicion Insufficient.— Fraud may be proved by circumstantial evidence, but evidence of the facts and circumstances from which fraud may be inferred must amount to proof of fraud; and to create a mere suspicion thereof is not sufficient to overcome the presumption of law in favor of the fair dealing of the parties.
Id.—Immaterial Finding—Intent of Grantor.—Where the court finds that the grantee was a bona fide purchaser for value without notice of any fraud on the part of the grantor, a finding as to the intent of the grantor in making the conveyance is immaterial.
Id.—Issue as to Consideration—Conjunctive Denial—Trial op Issue—Objection upon Appeal.—The objection that no issue was raised upon an averment as to want of consideration for the deed in controversy, by reason of a conjunctive denial in an answer, cannot be urged for the first time upon appeal, where the case was tried in the superior court upon the theory that the denial was sufficient to raise an issue as to the consideration, and the answer might have been amended to meet the objection if raised in the superior court.
COOPER,C. Action to quiet title. Judgment for plaintiff. Motion for new trial denied. This appeal is from the judgment and order. On July 24, 1893, and prior thereto, one L. Frank Ciar was the owner and seised in fee of the lands in controversy; and was then in insolvent circumstances and owed, among others, one Adolph Sommer the sum of four thousand eight hundred dollars, besides interest. On said date the said L. Frank Ciar made a bargain and sale deed of said lands to his brother, Leo II. Ciar. On September 11, 1893, said Sommer assigned the indebtedness so due him from L. Frank Ciar to defendant Leggett, and on September 21, 1893, Leggett commenced an action in the proper court against said L. Frank Ciar and had a writ of attachment issue, which said writ was levied upon the said lands September 22, 1893. On the following day, September 23d, the deed made by said L. Frank Ciar to his brother, Leo H., was placed on record in the county where the lands are situated. October 15, 1894, said Leo H. Ciar made a quitclaim deed of said lands to plaintiff, and on the 25th of the same month said Leggett recovered judgment against said L. Frank Ciar. On December 17, 1894, the defendant Leggett purchased the said premises at execution sale under his said judgment, the same having been sold as the property of said L. Frank Ciar. The defendants, other than Leggett, made default. Leggett, by his answer and cross-complaint, denied the execution, delivery, and consideration of the deed from L. Frank Ciar to Leo H. Ciar and of the deed from Leo H. Ciar to plaintiff, and asked the court to set aside the [669]said deeds, upon the ground that they were fraudulent, made without consideration, and that the lands were held in secret trust by plaintiff for said L. Frank Ciar. The plaintiff denied the averments of the cross-complaint, and upon the issues so made the case went to trial. The court found in favor of plaintiff upon the material issues, and the main contention of the defendant is the insufficiency of the evidence to justify these findings. The court found that the deed made by L. Frank Ciar to his brother Leo was made for a valuable consideration, to wit, in consideration of an indebtedness due from said L. Frank Ciar to his said brother, amounting to about $4,237.87. As this finding is the most vital one, and the one most earnestly attacked, we will first examine it. L. Frank Ciar testified that his father, before his death, left $670 in a sack for his brother Leo H., who was then a mere boy, and that the father, among his last requests, asked him to take care of it and keep it for Leo. That his father deeded him a lot in San Francisco about the year 1880 for himself and his brother Leo. That this property was sold for $5,000, and of this sum one-half of it belonged to Leo. That $2,000 of the amount realized from the sale of the real estate and the $670, and $680 due for wages, amounted, with interest, on July 24, 1893, to $4,600 or $4,700. That the money after the sale of the lot was placed in Leo’s hands, or, rather, $2,000 of it, together with the $670 and $500 that witness had from other sources. That Leo gave witness permission to use this money, and that witness did use it in his own business, and was thus indebted to his brother Leo on the twenty-fourth day of July, 1893, in a sum exceeding $4,600. Leo H. Ciar testified that he went with his older brother, L. Frank, to the safe deposit vault, and the money was placed in his hands, and he gave his brother L. Frank permission to use it in his own business. Ivan Ciar, another brother, testified to seeing and counting the $670 tied up in a sack in the vault of the safe deposit company with a tag on it bearing his brother Leo’s name. It further was testified by the brothers, Leo and Frank, that after Leo attained his majority he worked for Frank for seventeen months, and that such services were worth $40 per month, amounting to $680, and that Leo had never been paid. There is other testimony, but the above is sufficient to support
More from California Supreme Court
- People v. Wende (1979)
- People v. Watson (1956)
- People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996)
- People v. Kelly (2006)
- Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962)
- Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001)
- People v. Lewis (2021)
- In Re Estrada (1965)
- Denham v. Superior Court (1970)
- People v. Marsden (1970)