Sherwood v. Kyle

California Supreme Court Sep 6, 1899 No. S. F. No. 974Published

Before: Temple

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Holding. The court held that it would not interfere with the trial court's discretion in granting a new trial based on the conclusion that the jury's verdict was excessive and influenced by passion or prejudice.

Issues

Whether the trial court abused its discretion in granting a new trial conditioned upon the plaintiffs' refusal to remit a portion of the damages.
Whether the appellate court should set aside an order for a new trial when the trial judge determined the verdict was excessive.

Disposition. affirmed

Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion

“The power of the court to make a conditional order of this character is thoroughly settled in this state.”

“The judge should not grant a new trial merely because he deems the verdict excessive, unless it is so excessive as to indicate that it was the result of passion or prejudice.”

“that he abused his discretion must clearly appear before we can interfere.”

Synopsis

New Trial — Excessive Damages fob Seandeb — Conditional Obdeb—Power of Coubt.—Upon a motion for new trial upon the ground that excessive damages were awarded by the jury to the plaintiff in an action for slander, under the influence of passion or prejudice, the court has power to make a conditional order granting a new trial, unless the plaintiff shall remit the portion of the judgment for damages deemed by the court to be excessive.

Id.—Damages fob Personal Tort—Duty of Court—Discretion-Review upon Appeal.—In an action for damages for a personal tort, the court should not substitute its judgment for that of the jury, and should not grant a new trial for excessive damages, unless it is so excessive as to indicate that it was given under the influence of passion or prejudice. But the action of the court in granting a new trial upon that ground will not be disturbed upon appeal where it does not clearly appear that its discretion to grant it has been abused.

Id.—Order Granting New Trial—Review of Grounds of Motion. An order granting a new trial upon any ground may be sustained by the respondent upon any point involved in the motion.

TEMPLE, J. This is an action for slander, wherein the p1aintiffs seek damages for injurious words spoken of the plaintiff, Julia C., in respect to her profession or occupation as a school teacher.

After suitable allegations in regard to the qualification and occupation of said Julia C., plaintiffs charge that while engaged in her profession, and while school was in session, defendant entered her schoolroom, and, in the hearing of the pupils, spoke willfully and maliciously to, of and concerning said plaintiff the following false and scandalous words: “You have no business to be in charge of young children. You are no more fit to teach school than hell is for a powder-house,” meaning, et cetera.

[654]Defendant does not deny the language attributed to him, but says it was not malicious and has not damaged plaintiffs. He avers, also, that the language was privileged; he was a trustee of the school district, and, having evidence that the proper discipline was not maintained by such plaintiff, he went to the school to remonstrate, and did not intimate or say anything derogatory to Mrs. Sherwood, except that she did not maintain the proper control over her pupils, and for that reason only was unfit to teach. He denies that he harbors any malice or ill-will toward said plaintiff, or that he was at all angry with her. And he avers that his charge, that she was unfit to teach school because of her lack of power to control her" pupils, is true.

In another defense he alleges that he owns and occupies a farm adjoining the school lot, and the school children, through lack of proper control, have frequently committed depredations upon his property, and therefore he went to the teacher to complain and to request that she exercise some restraint over her pupils.

Plaintiffs recovered a verdict for one thousand dollars, which the trial judge, upon the motion for a new trial, adjudged to be excessive. The court then made an order granting a new trial unless plaintiffs would remit seven hundred dollars. This plaintiffs declined to remit and the order was made absolute.

The first question which naturally presents itself for consideration is whether this court can set aside the order on the ground that the court abused its discretion in ordering a new trial unless plaintiffs would remit a portion of their judgment. The power of the court to make a conditional order of this character is thoroughly settled in this state. (Gregg v. San Francisco etc. R. R. Co., 59 Cal. 312; Lee v. Southern Pac. Co., 101 Cal. 118; Domico v. Casassa, 101 Cal. 411.)

Sherwood v. Kyle

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