McKeeby v. City of Los Angeles
Before: Chipman
Synopsis
Opening of Street—Award of Damages to Estate of Decedent —Void Deed of Administrator.—Upon the opening of a street by a city, and the award of damages therefor to the estate of a deceased person, a deed to the city by the administrator of the land of the estate taken by the city for the street, executed without an order of court authorizing it, is void.
Id.—Use of Damages for Benefit of Estate—Consent of Heib— Action by Grantee.—Where the damages awarded to the estate were paid to the administrator and used for the benefit of the estate, which was settled with the full consent of the sole heir, after knowledge of all the. facts, his grantee, with like knowledge, cannot maintain an action to recover the damages a second time from the city.
Id.—Action for Damages—Title not Involved.—In an action by the grantee of an heir to recover damages for the taking of land of the estate by the city, under a void deed of the administrator, the title to the land, or the right of the city to retain possession of it as against the heir, is not involved.
Id.—Possession and Payment by City under Mistake of Law-Trespass—Duty of Administrator to Collect Damages.— The taking of possession of the street by the city and the payment of the damages, under a mistake of law as to the unauthorized deed of the administrator, has no other effect upon the claim for damages than if the city had taken possession by trespass, without the knowledge or consent of the administrator; and the claim for damages being an asset of the estate, it was the duty of the administrator to collect the damages for its benefit.
Id.—Statutes as to Sales of Land Inapplicable.—The statutes relating to sales of land by an administrator, compliance with which is essential to a valid sale, have no application to claims for damages accruing to the estate by reason of acts of trespass upon the land.
Id.—Effect of Distribution to Heir.—The heir having consented to the settlement of the estate with the claim for damages included therein by the administrator to his knowledge for the benefit of the estate, took the estate on distribution freed from any claim against the city on account of the damage to the land taken for the street; and his grantee stands in his shoes in relation thereto.
CHIPMAN, C. Action for damages. The court found the following facts: Under the provisions of the act of March 6, 1889 (Stats. 1889, p. 70), for laying out, opening, and extending any street et cetera, and to condemn and acquire any land necessary or convenient for that purpose, the city council of the [641]city of Los Angeles took all the steps required hy the statute to assess the benefits and damages for the opening of Castelar street into Bellevue avenue; the report of the commissioners was confirmed and adopted May 7, 1894, and among other pieces of property described in the ordinance of intention and in the report as land to be taken for said opening of said street was a portion of lot 24 in block H of the Fort Hill tract, reported as belonging, and which did belong to the estate of Mary Martin, deceased, and the sum of six hundred and twenty dollars was fixed and allowed as the value of said portion of said lot; Dv W. Field, public administrator, was the administrator of said estate at the time and so continued until after March 12, 1896; on February 15, 1895, the street commissioners, by warrant drawn on the funds of the treasury of said city to the account of said improvement, paid to said Field the sum of six hundred and twenty dollars, as administrator of said estate, and on that day he executed, as such administrator, to the city a deed conveying said portion of said lot and delivered the same to the commissioners; one Samuel Earl was the sole heir of deceased, and as such succeeded to all the property of the estate subject to all just debts of deceased and costs and expenses of administration; said sum so paid to said Field was used by him and applied “in payment of claims against said estate of Mary Martin, deceased, and costs of administration, duly allowed, and that in his final account as such administrator said Field fully accounted for the same as money received ‘for improving streets/ and that on the settlement of said final account it appeared that said estate was indebted in the sum of seven hundred and ten dollars, and that the further sum of ninety dollars, in addition to said sum of six hundred and twenty dollars, was required to pay off and discharge the debts and expenses of administration in order to close up said estate; that said sum of ninety dollars was advanced by said heir, Samuel Earl, and said account settled and allowed; that said Earl was represented on the hearing of settlement of said final account by his attorneys (one of whom is the plaintiff in this action), and that no exceptions or objections to said final account were made”; a decree of distribution was thereafter entered whereby the whole of said lot was distributed to said Earl, who there
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