People v. Winters

California Supreme Court Jul 10, 1899 No. Crim. No. 492Published

Before: Garoutte, Henshaw

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Holding. The court affirmed the defendant's murder conviction, holding that the trial court's instructions regarding reasonable doubt, alibi, and witness credibility were not prejudicially erroneous, and that the admission of hearsay evidence was harmless error.

Issues

Whether the trial court's instructions on reasonable doubt and alibi were legally sufficient.
Whether the trial court erred in refusing to give the defendant's requested instructions on identity and the defendant's testimony.
Whether the admission of hearsay declarations made by a co-conspirator after the crime was prejudicial error.

Disposition. affirmed

Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion

“The error committed by the trial court, therefore, in the admission of this evidence was purely abstract, and furnished no ground for a new trial.”

“The credit to be given the testimony of every witness, the defendant and all other witnesses, is a matter for the jury alone—a matter with which the court has nothing to do.”

Synopsis

Criminal Law—Homicide—Instruction—Reasonable Doubt.— Upon the trial of a defendant charged with murder, where the court has given a full and correct instruction upon the subject of reasonable doubt, it is not erroneous, or objectionable as being argumentative in form, to instruct the jury that “the doubt which acquits a. defendant on trial on a charge of crime must be a reasonable doubt in the sense mentioned, and no other.”

Id.—Instruction as to Distrust oe False Witness—An instruction “that a witness ascertained or appearing to be willfully false in one part of his testimony, as to the truth or falsity of a given proposition, is to be distrusted in other parts,” though somewhat out of the ordinary form, is not substantially objectionable.

Ld.—Instruction as to Alibi—Defense—Proof—Reasonable Doubt—A statement in an instruction upon the subject oí alibi, that “such a defense is as proper and legitimate, if proved, as any other defense,” is not strictly correct. An alibi is not matter of defense; and the words, “if proved,” standing alone, would be misleading. But where such statement is immediately followed by the statement to the jury that if the evidence is sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt as to whether the defendant was in some other place when the crime was committed, or not present at the time and place of its commission, they should give him the benefit of the doubt and acquit him, the instruction, as a whole, is not misleading.

Id.—Requested Instruction as to Alibi.—An instruction requested by the defendant upon the subject of alibi, which assumes to give defendant the benefit of any doubt raised, omitting the qualification of reasonable doubt, is properly refused.

Id.—Argumentative Instruction—Identity of Defendant.—An argumentative instruction as to the identity of the defendant, based upon the facts, and not containing any proposition of law, is properly refused.

Id.—Instruction as to Defendant’s Testimony—Province of Jury.—A requested instruction that the jury “are not permitted under the law to discredit or reject the testimony of the defendant, simply on the ground that he is accused and on trial on a criminal charge,” is properly refused, as being upon matter of fact, and not of law, and as invading the province of the jury, who are the sole judges of the credit to be given to the testimony of any witness.

Id.—Continuance—Insufficient Showing.—A continuance on the ground of the absence of witnesses for the defendant is properly refused, where the affidavits therefor do not show that the defendant has used any diligence to secure their attendance, or that their attendance could be procured at a subsequent day, if the continuance had been granted.

Id.—Evidence—Declarations of Goconspirator—Hearsay—Error Without Prejudice.—Declarations of a conspirator with the defendant, made after his arrest, and not in the presence of the defendant, as to whence he came, where he was going, and what was his business, are inadmissible hearsay, but if there is nothing in the declarations tending to implicate either the defendant or the declarant, the error in admitting them is without prejudice.

Opinion — Garoutte

GAROUTTE J. The defendant has been convicted of the crime of murder, and the death penalty adjudged. Upon appeal, he complains of various errors of law committed by the trial court.

A very full instruction upon the law of “reasonable doubt” was given to the jury, and it was therein said: “You are instructed that the doubt which acquits a defendant on trial on a charge of crime must be a reasonable doubt in the sense mentioned and no other.” Inasmuch as the instruction contained a full and sound statement of the law bearing upon the matter of reasonable doubt, there can be no valid objection to the foregoing language used by the court. Neither is the instruction susceptible to the objection that it is argumentative in form.

The following instruction was given: “You understand, of course, that a witness ascertained or appearing to be willfully false in one part of his testimony as to the truth or falsity of a given proposition of fact, is to be distrusted in other parts.” While this instruction is somewhat out of the ordinary form bearing upon the subject matter covered by it, still we find no substantial objection to it.

Upon the question of alibi the court said to the jury: “Such a defense is as proper and legitimate, if proved, as any other defense, and all the evidence bearing upon that point, if any, should be considered by you; and if, in view of all the evidence, you have any reasonable doubt as to whether the defendant was in some other place when the crime was committed, you should give the defendant the benefit of the doubt. In other words, the defendant is not bound or required to prove an alibi beyond a reasonable doubt to entitle him to an acquittal. It is sufficient if the evidence upon that point, if any, raises a reasonable doubt in your minds of his presence at the time and place of the commission of the crime charged.” Taken as a whole, this instruction is correct. In substance it states- the law. [328]There are a few expressions contained therein which could well have been omitted. As, for instance, strictly speaking, the matter of alibi is not a matter of defense. Again, the jury were told: "That such a defense is as proper and legitimate, if proved, as any other defense.” The words "if proved,” standing alone, would be seriously misleading, for an alibi in no sense in order to be successfully invoked need be proved, as that word is ordinarily used. (See People v. Roberts, 122 Cal. 377.) But it is perfectly evident from the context, taking the entire instruction together, that the court, in using those words, simply intended them to mean a sufficient degree of proof to raise a reasonable doubt in the minds-of the jury. We find many courts and law-writers’ referring to an alibi as matter of defense, and -also stating that it must be proved by defendant. We doubt the legal propriety of using either one of these expressions in those jurisdictions where it is held that an alibi is sufficiently established when a reasonable doubt is raised in the minds of the jurors as to the presence of the defendant at the scene of the crime. Yet these terms are used and held unobjectionable in all those instructions where the jury are clearly and fully told that a reasonable doubt in their minds as to the presence of the defendant at the scene of the homicide entitles him to an acquittal. In all those cases the word "proved” is held to mean the production of sufficient evidence to raise a reasonable doubt.

People v. Winters

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Synopsis

Opinion — Garoutte

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Dissent — Henshaw

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