Staacke v. Bell
Before: Chipman
Synopsis
Pleading—Prayer of Complaint—Relief Against Defaulting Defendant.—No relief can be granted against a defaulting defendant in excess of that specifically prayed for in the complaint; and the general prayer for relief cannot enlarge the power of the court to grant relief not prayed for against the defaulting defendant.
Id.—Prayer in Answer of Codefendants.—A defaulting defendant has the right to assume that no relief will be granted beyond that which the complaint specifically seeks; and codefendants, whose answer is not served upon the defaulting defendant, cannot, by any prayer for affirmative relief therein, extend the specific relief properly granted, beyond that asked for in the complaint, as against such defaulting defendant.
Venue of Real Action—Decree to be Considered.—In determining whether an action is, in effect, a real action, quieting title to land, or enforcing a lien thereon, which must be brought in the county where the land is situated, the court will consider not only the prayer for relief in the complaint and answers, but also the terms of the decree.
Id.—Decree as to Effect of Trust Deed—Under the complaint in an action not brought in the county where the lands described in a trust deed were situated, seeking to renew the trust deed and the promissory note by which it was secured, so as not to affect the rights of the parties to a prior action pending in the county where the lands were situated, brought to enforce a trust in favor of other parties against the trustor, who were made defendants to the new action, and under answers of the creditor and trustees named in the trust deed, seeking to protect the trust deed as a paramount conveyance and lien, a decree adjudging that the original trust deed is a first charge on the lands, and is and shall remain prior and superior to any claim, charge, or lien to or on said lands in favor of the other parties, cannot be rendered. Such relief can only be had in an action brought where the lands are situated.
Validity of Trust Deed—Restraint upon Alienation.—A trust deed to secure indebtedness payable at a fixed future date does not create a trust in violation of the statute against perpetuities, or forbidding restraint upon alienation beyond the possibility of lives in being.
CHIPMAN, C. The action is brought in the superior court of the city and county of San Francisco, and the complaint alleges that on February 1, 1892, plaintiff executed and deliv[311]ered to defendant, San Francisco Savings Union, his promissory note, due February 1, 1893, for sixty thousand dollars, to secure payment of which plaintiff executed á conveyance to defendants Henry 0. Campbell and Thaddeus B. Kent of certain lands in Santa Barbara county. This conveyance is set out in the complaint and is an ordinary deed of trust. The complaint then alleges that on March 8, 1893, “the defendant John S. Bell commenced an action against plaintiff and the defendant John W. C. Maxwell in the superior court .... in and for the county of Santa Barbara, which action is ... . undetermined. .... That by the pleadings in said action it is claimed by all the parties thereto that this plaintiff holds said land in trust. That on the sixteenth day of October, 1892, said Thomas Bell died in the said city and county of San Francisco, leaving a last will, a copy whereof is ... . made part hereof.” Thomas Bell is not previously mentioned in the complaint, but appears in the title of the cause as deceased. There is no explanation in the complaint for making the heirs,or executors of Thomas Bell parties to the action. The complaint then avers the appointment of plaintiff and defendant John W. 0. Maxwell as executors of the will of said Thomas Bell; that the principal of the note and some interest are still due; that the San Francisco Union “is willing to renew said note and security, or to extend the time for the payment of said note, if plaintiff can procure proper authority to make such renewal or extension, hut otherwise demands immediate payment of said note, and intends, in default thereof, to cause said lands to he sold by the trustees, Campbell and Kent, to satisfy said indebtedness; that said lands are of much greater value than the amount of said indebtedness, if sold in parcels and at a time when there is a demand for such property, but at present the market for such property is depressed, and .... that if said property should be sold at this time by said trustees it would probably realize but little if any more than sufficient to pay said indebtedness.” There is nothing in the complaint to show the nature of the trust referred to in the action pending in Santa Barbara county, or when it arose. The prayer is for the judgment of the court “authorizing and directing plaintiff to execute a new note in place of- the note above mentioned, or a renewal of the note [312]
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