Doolin v. Omnibus Cable Co.
Before: Britt
Synopsis
New Tbial—Conditional Obdeb—Excessive Vebdict—Damages fob Negligence—Conflicting Evidence—In an action to recover damages for negligence, where the evidence was conflicting as to the extent of the injuries sustained at the time of the accident, which at that time appeared to be small, and as to whether distressing symptoms afterward manifested were or were not attributable to those injuries, the action of the trial court in conditionally granting a new trial for an excessive verdict of twenty thousand dollars’ damages, unless plaintiff should remit fifteen thousand dollars therefrom, is not an abuse of discretion.
Id.—CONSTBUCTION OF CODE—“PASSION OB PBEJUDICE”—INSUFFI-CIENCY of Evidence.—In the provision of subdivision 5 of section 657 of the Code of Civil Procedure, for the granting of a new trial for “excessive damages, appearing to have been given under the influence of passion or prejudice,” the only means of discovering the element of “passion or prejudice” within the meaning of the statute is by comparing the amount with the evidence before the court at the trial; and that expression is but one mode of saying that the evidence is insufficient to justify the verdict for excessive damages.
Id.—Review upon Appeal—Conflicting Evidence—Discbetion.— The review upon appeal of the action of the trial court in granting a new trial absolutely or conditionally for excessive damages, where there is a material conflict of evidence, will be governed by the same rule as to abuse of discretion, as if the ground of the order were insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict.
BRITT, C. Defendant, a street railway corporation, was engaged in the business of transporting passengers for hire on certain streets of the city of San Francisco. On November 17,1891, the plaintiff, Mary J. Doolin, wife of Michael J. Doolin, who joins with her in this action, was a passenger on one of defendant’s cars; the driver in charge thereof lost control of the horses by which the car was drawn and they pulled the car from the track and down an embankment; plaintiffs allege in their complaint that this was in consequence of the negligence of the defendant and its servant, the driver, and that thereby said Mary was violently thrown against the seat and floor of the ear and sustained severe personal injuries for which they pray damages.
The trial of the action was commenced on September 25, 1893, and was concluded October 9, 1893. The evidence for plaintiffs tended to show that as the result of said accident Mrs. Doolin fell on the floor of the car and sustained, besides some minor hurts, a concussion of the spine which drew after it a train of evil con[143]sequences, such as great nervous debility, incompetence to walk without assistance, retention of urine, incoherence of speech, impaired vision, impaired memory,sleeplessness,hysterical and other effects, all of which, her counsel claim, “rendered her a physical wreck and seriously impaired her mind and memory.” She appeared at the trial as a witness on her own behalf. There was evidence for both sides that on May 8, 1893, an examination of Mrs. Doolin, with a view to ascertaining her physical and mental condition, was made by some medical gentlemen—three of them acting at the instance of the defendant, and three or four others on behalf of the plaintiffs. Several of them testified at the trial—both those for plaintiffs and those for defendant— that upon such examination they discovered that the patient had either a uterine or ovarian tumor—they differing as to its precise locality—which was then about the size of a cocoanut; and plaintiffs’ family physician, who participated in such examination, testified that at time of trial such tumor had become about four times as large as it appeared to be when first discovered. Most of the medical witnesses expressed the opinion that concussion of the spine would not produce the tumor; though one of those called for plaintiffs stated that “it could have been produced by a shock to the patient in this way, that from the fact of a hemorrhage having followed from the blow a certain amount of fluid may have been thrown out into the intestices of the womb, and that may have become a nidus for a tumor.”
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