Peiser v. Griffin

California Supreme Court Jun 8, 1899 No. S. F. No. 1091Published

Before: Henshaw

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Holding. The court held that the trial court properly denied the plaintiffs' motion to file an amended complaint because the amendment introduced a new and distinct cause of action that was already barred by the statute of limitations under Section 164 of the Civil Code. Furthermore, the court held that the subsequent 1897 amendment to the statute could not retroactively revive a cause of action that had already expired.

Issues

Whether the trial court erred in refusing to allow the filing of an amended complaint that introduced a new cause of action.
Whether the statute of limitations under Section 164 of the Civil Code barred the plaintiffs' proposed amended cause of action.
Whether a subsequent amendment to the statute of limitations could retroactively revive a time-barred cause of action.

Disposition. affirmed

Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion

“The court refused permission to file this offered pleading. In so doing it held that the proposed complaint did not amend the old, but charged upon a new and distinct cause of action, and that the statute of limitations barred plaintiffs’ right”

“By its running the title to the property, irrespective of the original right, is regarded as vested in the possessor, and the subsequent repeal of the limitation law cannot be given a retroactive effect so as to disturb the title.”

Synopsis

Action to Enforce Trust—Amendment to Complaint—Change of Action—Transfer of Community Property by Wife—Statute of Limitations.—A complaint by a husband and child to enforce a trust against his wife, and her grantees, based upon the theory that she took the legal title as trustee for the benefit of the husband, wife and child, in equal shares, and conveyed it in violation of the trust, and that her grantee and his successor were not innocent purchasers, cannot be amended so as to change the cause of action by averring that the property held in the name of the wife was community property, of which she could not transfer the title, if such new cause of action was barred by the statute of limitations at the time of the proposed amendment.

Id.—Limitation of Past Cause of Action—Valid Amendment of Code. The - amendment of March 3, 1893, to section 164 of the Civil Code, providing that where married women conveyed real property acquired prior to May 19, 1889, the husband shall be barred from commencing any action to show that said real property was community property from and after July 1, 1894, is a valid statute of limitations, fixing the time within which an action to avoid such a past conveyance by the wife must be brought.

Id.—Amendment After Bar of Action—Constitutional Law.—If the statute of limitations has barred the right to commence an action to set aside a conveyance, the title of the property is regarded as vested in the possessor, irrespective of the original right, and no subsequent amendment or repeal of the limitation can constitutionally have a retroactive effect so as to disturb the title.

Id.—Findings—Payment by Husband—Trust.—A finding in the action to' enforce the trust that the husband paid for the property held in the wife’s name is not a finding that the property was community property, and does not warrant a judgment for the bus* band if the court finds that the wife did not hold the property in trust.

-d.—Failure of Action—Omission to Find—Title of Intervenor.— Where, under the findings made, the judgment properly followed that the plaintiffs take nothing by their action, an omission to find determinately as to the title of an intervenor, who claimed to be a bona 'fide purchaser for value from the grantee of the wife, is immaterial, and cannot work an injury to the plaintiffs.

HENSHAW, J. Lemuel Peiser for himself and as guardian ad litem of Edwin A. Peiser, his minor son, sued Thomas H. Griffin and Minnie L. Peiser, his wife. He alleged that on May 1, 1889, two certain lots of land in San Francisco were purchased with his money, and “that the deed of conveyance was had and made in the name of Minnie L. Peiser for the purpose of and in trust for plaintiff and said Minnie L. Peiser, and the child of parties, Edwin Adair Peiser”; that Thomas H. Griffin conspired with Minnie Peiser to defraud plaintiffs of their property, and, exercising undue influence upon her, induced her to convey and transfer the property to him. A judgment was sought restraining Griffin from alienating the property and set[11]ting aside Mrs. Peiser’s deed to him. This complaint was filed on June 26, 1889.

Griffin answered denying the charge of undue influence. In October, 1890, W. B. Bradbury was allowed to intervene, and filed his complaint, in which he set up that without notice and for a valuable consideration he had upon June 24, 1889, purchased the property from Griffin. The answer to this complaint in intervention consisted of denials and an iteration of the matters pleaded in the original complaint. It was filed in March,-1895.

Upon these pleadings trial was had. The court found that the land in question was paid for with the money of Lemuel Peiser, and that the deed was taken in the name of his wife;. that his wife did not hold the-title to the property under any trust; that the wife conveyed the property to Griffin without any valuable consideration, but that she had not been moved to the making of the deed by undue influence; that Bradbury purchased the property upon June 24, 1889, for a valuable consideration. The judgment denied plaintiffs any relief, and gave costs to defendant Griffin and intervenor Bradbury. From this judgment, and from the order denying a new trial, plaintiffs appeal.

Upon the trial it was -shown that Mrs. Peiser conveyed to Griffin one lot, and assigned to him a contract for the purchase of a second lot. Plaintiffs thereupon sought leave to file an • amended complaint, setting up that the first lot was purchased with community funds, and was community property; that the same was true of the second lot, and that the later installments called for by the contract had all been paid by the plaintiff since the commencement of the action. The court refused permission to file this offered pleading. In so doing it held that the proposed complaint did not amend the old, but charged upon a new and distinct cause of action, and that the statute of limitations barred plaintiffs’ right to prosecute upon this new cause. The soundness of the court’s ruling on this matter is the most important question in this case.

Peiser v. Griffin

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