Beattie v. Crewdson
Before: Chipman
Synopsis
Notice to Subsequent Pubciiasee — Possession under Unrecorded Deed.—An unrecorded deed is valid as between the parties and as against subsequent purchasers having notice thereof, and the possession of the grantee of such unrecorded deed is notice of his title to a subsequent purchaser from the same grantor.
In.—Protection of Bona Fide Purchaser—Burden of Proof as to Notice.—The subsequent purchaser cannot be protected as a bona fide purchaser if he had notice, actual or constructive, of the occupant’s prior title, at any time before payment of thq money; and the burden of proof Is upon him to show that he had nut such notice.
Id.—Findings—Possession and Notice—Sufficiency of Evidence.—The evidence reviewed, and held sufficient to support findings as to the possession and improvements by the first purchaser under an unrecorded deed which was lost; and that a subsequent grantee and succeeding grantees claiming under the same grantor, each had notice of the rights of the occupant, and that none of •them were bona fide purchasers for value, without notice.
Id.—Immaterial Finding as to Taxes—Adverse Possession not Involved.—A finding that the first purchaser had paid taxes upon the premises possessed by him for five years next preceding the commencement of the action is not material, no adverse possession being involved, as against a subsequent purchaser claiming under the same grantor, with notice of the rights of the occupant; and if such finding is not supported by the evidence it is error without injury.
Id.—Procurement of Tax Deeds by Subsequent Purchaser—Title not Strengthened—Notice to Purchaser. — A subsequent purchaser claiming under the same grantor, and having notice of the rights of a prior purchaser in possession, cannot strengthen his title by procuring an outstanding tax title, with like notice.
Id.—Record upon Appeal—Tax Deeds not Shown—Decision against Validity. — The tax deeds not being printed in the record upon appeal, the decision of the superior court against their validity, as affecting the rights of the occupant, will not be disturbed upon appeal. The court may have found in them fatal defects.
Id.—Exclusion of Evidence—Declarations upon Delivery of Deeds— Error not Shown.—The exclusion of evidence as to what was said, or as to what occurred, at the time of the delivery of several deeds passing from a subsequent grantee to other grantees successively, without any offer to show its relevancy and competency, and that it was not hearsay, does not appear to be erroneous.
CHIPMAN, C. Ejectment. The property consists of certain lots in Hewitt’s addition to the city of Santa Rosa. Trial hy the court without a jury. Defendant Crewdson claimed title to the lots in question, and hy way of cross-complaint asked to have his title quieted. Defendant Michaels answered that he is not and has not been in possession since June 1, 1897 (the complaint was filed December 7, 1897), and defendant Pol-' lini claims that he occupies the premises as tenant of defendant Crewdson. Judgment was given in favor of Crewdson that he is the owner and entitled to possession and quieting his title. Plaintiff appeals from the judgment and from an order denying his motion for new trial.
The court found the following facts: That one Behmer in April, 1885, being the owner of the lots, sold the same for full value to defendant Crewdson by deed of conveyance, which said deed was not recorded and was afterward lost; soon after receiving his deed Crewdson took possession of the property under his deed, and immediately began improving the same, and erected a dwelling thereon costing eight hundred dollars, which was completed by the first of the year 1886, and he has ever since been in the actual and continuous possession of the premises, and is now in possession of the same; Crewdson has never sold or conveyed said property, or any part thereof, and has paid all taxes levied and assessed upon the property “for the five years next prior to the commencement of the action”; said Behmer had no interest in the property since April, 1885; on May 27, 1893, said Behmer and wife made and delivered their deed to the property to one Julia E. Riley, which was duly recorded, but said Behmers did not then own the property, nor were they in actual possession thereof, hut defendant Crewdson was then “in the actual, open, and notorious and exclusive [579]possession oí said property, and said Biley at said time had notice of the right, interest, and equities of said Crewdson in and to said premises”; there is “no evidence that said Biley paid any valuable consideration for said property, or that she was a bona 'fide purchaser of said property.” It is further "found that said Biley deeded the property to one Angelina Hutton June 26, 1896, and this deed was duly recorded, and that Mrs. Hutton conveyed by deed to plaintiff Hovember 21, 1896, which was duly recorded, and that neither Mrs. Biley nor Mrs. Hutton owned the property at the time, and that Mrs. Hutton and plaintiff had notice of Crewdson’s possession of and interest in the lot when they took their deeds, and that Mrs. Hutton paid no value for said premises and ivas not a purchaser in good faith, and that there is no evidence that plaintiff was a purchaser in good faith without notice, or that he ever paid any valuable consideration for said premises.
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