People v. Patterson
Before: McFarland
Synopsis
Criminal Law—Robbery — Sufficiency of Evidence.—The evidence .reviewed, and held sufficient to sustain a verdict of guilty of robbery against the defendant in feloniously taking money from the person of another.
Id.—Refusal to Strike out Evidence.—It is not error to refuse to strike out the testimony of a witness called for the prosecution which had some relevancy to the issues in the case, and was not prejudicial to the defendant, nor to refuse to strike out testimony introduced without objection on cross-examination about matters testified to in chief.
Id.—Cross-examination.—Where a witness had testified in chief for the defendant that he heard of the prosecuting witness being robbed on a certain date, he may be asked, on cross-examination, how he knew he was robbed at that time.
Id.—Questions by District Attorney—Discourteous Language—Misconduct.—The mere asking of a single question by the district attorney, the objection to which was sustained, does not warrant a reversal of the judgment; nor is the use of discourteous language in talking to the jury respecting the counsel of the defendant, a portion of which was withdrawn, and which could not have been in a material sense prejudicial to the defendant, such misconduct as requires the granting of a new trial.
Id.—Discrediting of False Witness—Naming of Witness—Modification of Instructions.—It is proper to modify an instruction requested by the defendant to the effect that if the'jury found that a witness named testified falsely in one place, they were at liberty to disregard his testimony entirely, by striking out the name of the witness specified, and inserting in place thereof the words “any witness,” leaving it to counsel to make the application.
McFARLAND, J. The defendant was convicted of robbery, alleged to have been committed by the felonious taking away, from the person of one Heisler of eighteen dollars in money. The defendant appeals from the judgment and from an order denying his motion for a new trial.
The main point of the appeal is, that there was not sufficient evidence to warrant the verdict. But Heisler testified that during the evening of February 24, 1898, he left a certain saloon in company with the appellant and one McMahon, who was also _ convicted of the same crime, and that while the three were walking along the street the appellant and McMahon suddenly attacked him, seized him by the throat and stfuck him a blow which knocked him down and rendered him for a time insensible; and that when he recovered consciousness he found that he had been robbed of about eighteen dollars in coin. He soon afterward returned to the saloon bleeding from a wound in the head. As to the fact that he had left the saloon a short time before in company with the appellant and McMahon, he was corroborated by the witness Swope. No doubt the testimony of Heisler was somewhat weakened by the fact that he was a good deal under the influence of liquor, by the fact .that shortly before leaving the saloon he had pretended to the bartender that he had no money to pay for drinks, and by a few other circumstances. But, although the ease made out by the prosecution was not a particularly strong one, yet we would not be justified in saying that the jury should not have believed his testimony, and therefore, under the rule so well established, we cannot say that there was not sufficient material evidence to warrant the jury in finding a verdict of guilty.
The judgment cannot be reversed on account of any alleged errors of law.
It was not error in the court to refuse to strike out the testimony of the witness Hughes, who was called for the proseen[104]tion. His evidence had some relevancy to the issues in the case, and, at all events, it was not prejudicial to the appellant, but was really to his advantage.
On the cross-examination of appellant’s witness, McMahon, the prosecution asked him: “How do you know he was robbed that evening?” To this appellant objected as not cross-examination, and the objection was overruled. . On his examination in chief lie,had said: “I heard of his being robbed on the twenty-fourth day of February.” This fairly bore the construction that he had heard on the twenty-fourth day of February that the robbery had occurred, and it was quite proper to ask him on cross-examjnation how he knew on the • twenty-fourth that the robbery had occurred. The witness’ answer was that he had not said that he knew on the twenty-fourth that he (Heisler) had been robbed, but that he had. merely heard at some other time that he had been robbed on the twenty-fourth. There was nothing in this improper or prejudicial to the appellant.
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