Kuhl v. Kuhl
Before: Haynes
Synopsis
Divorce—Extreme Cruelty—Evidence—Plaintiff not Corroborated. A divorce cannot he granted upon the uncorroborated testimony •of the plaintiff; and acts of extreme cruelty testified to by the plaintiff without me slightest corroboration, and denied by the defendant, are not proved by evidence upon which the court could base a finding for the plaintiff.
Id.—Charge after Desertion—Stealing Wife’s Property—Speculation in Stocks—Absence of Malice.—A charge by the wife against the husband of stealing her diamonds and sealskin saeque, made after his desertion of her, cannot form any justification or excuse for the desertion; and where the evidence indicates that the wife's charge was, not malicious, but was made in the rea son-able Delief that he had taken the property to raise money tfiereon with which to speculate in stocks, after she had declined his request that she would raise money for that purpose, and there is evidence that the husband acknowledged that he deserted his wife by reason of disappointment in money matters, and that he supposed she was wealthy and would let him have money, the charge made by the wife after his desertion of her does not amount to extreme cruelty.
Id.—Extreme Crueviy—Questions of Law and Fact.—What constitutes extreme cruelty, as a cause of divorce, is matter of law; hut whether the evidence shows such conduct is a question of fact. Ordinarily, what constitutes extreme cruelty is a mixed question' of law and fact; and where the evidence, assuming it to be true, is not legally sufficient, the court may so decide as a question of law.
1 d —Judgment upon Merits—Dismissal—Res Adjudicata.—A judgment •rendered upon the merits after the trial of an action for divorce, dismissing the action, in the usual form in equitable actions, does not permit of a relitigation of the issues, unless the dismissal is expressly made without prejudice to a new action.
HAYNES, C. Action for divorce on the ground of extreme cruelty. The action was tried' before Hon. D. J. Murphy, late judge of the superior court, who found from the evidence that the defendant was not guilty of extreme cruelty toward the plaintiff, and did not inflict upon him grievous mental suffering, and, as no affirmative relief was sought by defendant, judgment of dismissal was entered. Plaintiff moved for a new trial upon the ground that the evidence was not sufficient to justify the findings, and that the decision was against law. A bill of exceptions was settled by Judge Murphy, and the motion was afterward heard before Judge Bahrs, who made an order granting a new trial, and from that order the defendant appeals.
The complaint alleged that the parties intermarried July 23, 1895; that on divers occasions the defendant was guilty of extreme cruelty toward the plaintiff, and particularly as follows: “In the month of April, 1896, she had angrily upbraided the plaintiff, and said to him, Hod curse your soul/ and on many occasions in or about said month of April, 1896, she called him a ‘damned Dutchman’ and a ‘loafer.’ In the month of May, 1896, the defendant falsely and maliciously accused plaintiff to sundry of his business acquaintances and friends of having stolen diamonds and a sealskin sacque”; that said acts and conduct inflicted upon plaintiff grievous mental suffering.
The answer put in issue all these allegations. The plaintiff testified that defendant used toward him the epithets alleged in the complaint, and the defendant testified as explicitly that she did not, and that she did not use toward the colored servant girl any such language as plaintiff testified to. As to these matters the plaintiff was not corroborated in the slightest degree, and hence, as to them, there was no evidence upon which the court could base a finding for the plaintiff. “Ho divorce can be granted upon the default of the defendant, or upon the uncorroborated statement, admission, or testimony of the parties.” (Civ. Code, sec. 130.)
As to the allegation in the complaint that “in the month of May 1, 1896, the defendant falsely and maliciously accused plaintiff to sundry of his business acquaintances and friends of [59]having stolen diamonds and a sealskin sacque,” a somewhat fuller statement is required.
These parties were married in July, 1895. The epithets of which the plaintiff complained he testified were used in the following March, and on May 13, 1896, he left the defendant, and did not afterward return, and informed two of defendant’s friends, whom she had sent to ascertain the cause of his absence, that he would never return or live with her again. While living together they occupied defendant’s house. At the time plaintiff left her defendant was sick in bed and had been for about ten days. She missed her diamonds and sacque soon after the plaintiff left, and about the last of May she called on Mr. Hadley, a personal and intimate friend of the plaintiff, and, in the language testified to by him, told him “that her husband had left the house where they were living, and had taken her diamonds and also her sealskin sacque. She asked me if he had pledged them to me or whether he had tried to get a loan upon them'from me. I told her no; that I did not believe he had taken them; that I did not believe Kuhl capable of doing such a thing.”
More from California Supreme Court
- People v. Wende (1979)
- People v. Watson (1956)
- People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996)
- People v. Kelly (2006)
- Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962)
- Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001)
- People v. Lewis (2021)
- In Re Estrada (1965)
- Denham v. Superior Court (1970)
- People v. Marsden (1970)