City of Eureka v. McKay & Co.
Before: Henshaw
Synopsis
Dedication op Street—Question op Intent.—The dedication of a public street is a question of intent, and the acts of the owner of property are sufficient to prove a dedication only when they are evincive of such intent, or are such as to estop him from denying that such was his intent.
Id.—Street upon Marsh Land—Charter op City—Designation op ' Boundaries.—An act granting a charter to a city, and describing therein, as part of its exterior boundaries, a street called “A” street, which in fact was not open to travel or used as a street, though designated as “A” street upon an unauthorized map in the recorder’s office, as crossing marsh lands on the water front, no cross streets or connecting streets being referred to in the act, and the board of trustees of the town being required therein to lay off the water front in such lots as would accommodate mill owners and other occupants, and to sell the same to bona fide possessors, cannot be construed as intended to dedicate such street or to operate as a dedication thereof.
Id.—Unauthorized Map—Offer of Dedication—Legislative Adoption. An unauthorized map deposited in the recorder’s office by a person having no interest in the land cannot amount to an offer of dedication; and an act of the legislature incorporating a city, which does not refer to such map, cannot be construed as an adoption thereof, because merely referring to a street by the same designation which is indicated upon the map.
Id.—Municipal Ordinance—Survey of Town.—A municipal ordinance employing a surveyor to survey the town, “and set stakes at the corner of all blocks lying between A and N streets,” does not operate as a dedication of “A” street, which had never been dedicated to public use, nor opened or used as a street, nor does it authorize the surveyor to lay out a new street or to file a map showing new or any streets.
Id.—Deed by City—Boundaries Including Unopened Street.—A deed executed by the city to an occupant of land, specifically describing boundaries which include part of an unopened and unused street which had not in fact been dedicated to public use, without any reservation made in the deed, carries the title to the grantee of all the land granted, and indicates that the city did not then believe itself to have dedicated the street to public use.
Appeal from Judgment—Stipulated Facts—Reversal—New Trial.— If the facts in a case are stipulated by the parties, and the judgment is reversed upon an appeal therefrom, it is not necessary to order a new trial, but judgment will be ordered upon' the stipulated facts in favor of the opposite party.
HENSHAW, J. This is an action in ejectment brought by the city of Eureka to recover from defendants a piece of land alleged to be a public street of that city, described and known as "A Street." The answer denied the allegations of the complaint, and affirmatively pleaded the statute of limitations and an estoppel against plaintiff. The case was tried upon an agreed state[668]ment of facts. Judgment passed for plaintiff, and defendant appeals.
In 1850 a settlement was made on the site of what afterwards came to be the town of Eureka, now the city of Eureka. In that year one Ryan made a map entitled “Map of Eureka.” Before the eighteenth day of April, 1856, this map was deposited in the office of the recorder of Humboldt county, and has since remained in the office of the recorder. It bears upon it no marks of filing. The map represented blocks, lots and streets, those streets running generally north and south being named from the letters of the alphabet, those running at right angles to them by numbers. “A street,” as delineated, forms the western boundary of the town, and extends from the waters of Humboldt bay southerly beyond Third street. On April 18, 1856, the legislature passed an act incorporating the town of Eureka. (Stats. of 1856, p. 103.) The boundaries of the town were thus delimited: “Commencing at a point one hundred yards north of A and First streets in Humboldt bay, and running south to the corner of A and First streets, thence southerly along A street to 16th street; thence easterly along 16th street to S street,” etc. In the following year the state ceded to the town of Eureka all of the land which by virtue of its sovereignty it owned within the corporate limits of the town. (Stats. of 1857, p. 76.) Of the land so owned by the state and so granted to the municipality, a. part was the “water front” of the town, defined in the act to be the land within the corporate limits of the town “extending from highwater mark to a point in the bay where the water shall not be over six feet deep at low tide.” The other land which passed to the town by this grant was the marsh land lying between this water front and the upland proper. The land here in controversy is a part of this marsh land. The act contained the following provision: “Section 2. The board of trustees of said town are hereby authorized and required to lay off the said water front in lots of such size and in such manner as will accommodate and subserve the interest of the present 'mill owners’ and other occupants, and shall proceed to sell such lots as are now in the Iona fide possession of such 'mill owners’ and other occupants, to said occupants, at a price not to exceed one dollar per front foot, and extending from highwater mark to a point in the bay where the water shall
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