Briggs v. Breen
Before: Beatty, Britt
Synopsis
Estates of Deceased Persons—Personal Liability of Executors— Services of Attorneys—Reasonable Value.—In the absence of an agreement to limit the liability of executors for the services of attorneys employed by them to such sum as may be allowed from the estate by the court sitting in probate, they are personally liable for the reasonable value of such services, and an action may be maintained against them to recover such reasonable value.
Id.—Settlement of Accounts—Attorney not “ Interested in Estate.” An attorney for an executor or administrator is not “interested in the estate” within the meaning of sections 1635 and 1637 of the Code of Civil Procedure and is neither required to contest the accounts of the executor or administrator, nor concluded by the settlement of his accounts.
Id.—Allowance for Attorney’s Fees.—The estate is not liable to an attorney, and the allowance for attorney’s fees is made to the executor or administrator, and not to the attorney.
■ Id.—Contest of Accounts by Attorney—Estoppel—Credit of Amount Received.—The actual appearance of an attorney in the court sitting in probate, and his filing of exceptions to the account of attorney’s fees contained in an executor’s account, is immaterial, except as evidence bearing upon the question whether he expected to look to the estate or to the executor for his fees. The settlement of the account does not conclude him from claiming a larger sum from the executors personally; but the amount received from the executors must be credited in a personal action against them.
Id.—Joinder of Executor with Administrator of Deceased Executor —Construction of Code.—Under section 379 of the Code of Civil Procedure allowing any person to be made a defendant “who has or claims an interest in the controversy adverse to the plaintiff, or who is a necessary party to a complete determination or settlement of the question involved therein,” an executor may be joined with the administrator of a deceased executor in an action to recover the reasonable value of services rendered to both executors jointly by an attorney; but the recovery against the administrator of the deceased executor must be limited to payment in due course of administration.
Opinion — Britt
BRITT, C. Action for the alleged value of professional services rendered by plaintiffs as attorneys at law (they being partners in practice) to the defendant James F. Breen, and one John R. Breen, who were executors of the last will of a certain decedent. It appears that the executors employed plaintiffs to conduct the ordinary legal proceedings for the administration of the testator’s estate and in the defense of certain actions brought against the executors in their official character; such employment terminated upon the death of said John R. Breen, which occurred August 31, 1894. On July 13, 1895, the surviving executor, James F. Breen, hied in court his final account of the administration; therein he prayed a credit of twelve hundred and fifty dollars for the payment of plaintiffs and alleged that sum to be the reasonable value of their services. Before the account was filed plaintiffs notified the executor that they were dissatisfied with this sum; and after the filing thereof they filed written exception to the same, stating that said sum “is not reasonable compensation for the .services of said attorneys, and they ask leave to submit evidence to the court of the value of said services, to the end that said attorneys have from said estate reasonable compensation.” Upon the hearing of said account the plaintiffs were, it seems, present in court, but declined to introduce any evidence touching the item aforesaid; and the account was settled and allowed as rendered. Afterward plaintiffs brought this action; the administrator of the estate of John R. Breen, the deceased executor, is joined as a defendant with James F. Breen, plaintiffs having first presented their claim to him for allowance as a debt of said John R. Breen and the claim having been rejected.
The matters above stated appear from the findings of the court or the admissions of the pleadings. The court further found that no agreement or understanding was ever had between plaintiffs and the executors as to the amount of compensation for the [659]services of plaintiffs, nor the source from which payment was to be made, nor that they should receive such sum as the court should fix on settlement of the accounts of the executors; also, that the reasonable value of said services was the sum of eighteen hundred dollars; but the court held that “By reason of the conclusiveness on plaintiffs of the allowance in the probate court”—meaning the superior court sitting in probate in the matter of said final account—they were entitled to judgment for the sum of twelve hundred and fifty dollars only, which was entered accordingly.
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