In re Coffey

GAROUTTE, J. Section 518 of the Penal Code reads: “Extortion is the obtaining of property from another with his consent induced by a wrongful use of force or fear, or under color [523]of official right.” Section 524 provides: “Every person who unsuccessfully attempts, hy means of any verbal threat, such as is specified in section 519, to extort money or other property from another, is guilty of a misdemeanor.” Section 287 of the Code of Civil Procedure declares: “An attorney and counselor may be removed or suspended by the supreme court or any department thereof, or by any superior court of the state, for either of the following causes arising after his admission to practice: 1. His conviction of a felony or misdemeanor involving moral turpitude, in which case the record of conviction shall be conclusive evidence.”

John J. Coffey, an attorney of this court, has been convicted of the offense of attempted extortion as outlined by the aforesaid section 524. A certified copy of the record of his conviction was placed before this court, and, upon an order to show cause why he (Coffey) should not be removed as an attorney and counselor at law, he made answer as follows: 1. A certified copy of the record of conviction was not transmitted to this court within thirty days after the conviction was had, as required by section 288 of the Code of Civil Procedure; 2. A judgment of disbarment in addition to the fine imposed upon respondent would be violative of the constitutional provision that cruel or unusual punishment shall not be inflicted; 3. It does not appear, and it is not true, that the misdemeanor of "which this respondent was convicted involved moral turpitude within the provision of section 287 of the Code of Civil Procedure, upon which this proceeding is based; 4. The police court in which this respondent was convicted had no jurisdiction to try the respondent for the alleged offense, and its proceedings therein were coram non judice.

We see no merit whatever in the first, second, and fourth defenses made by respondent in his answer, and they require no extended consideration. By the third defense it is insisted that the misdemeanor of which the respondent has been convicted does not involve “moral turpitude.” This contention presents the only important question in the case. It must be true that, if the actual commission of an offense involves moral turpitude, then an attempt to commit that offense likewise involves turpitude. It therefore follows that, if the crime of extortion by any of the threats enumerated in section 519 of the Penal Code in