Haskins v. Jordan
Before: Henshaw
Synopsis
Slander—Falsity of Scandalous Words—Pleading.—In an action o£ slander, where words charging the defendant with a crime are alleged in the complaint, an averment in the complaint that the defendant spoke “the false and scandalous words following.’’' is a sufficient allegation of their falsity, as against a general demurrer.
Setoff of Judgments—Power of Court.—The power of a court to set off one judgment against another exists independent of statute, and rests upon the general jurisdiction of courts over their suitors and processes.
Id.—Legal or Equitable Belief — Bight of Suitor. — In this state, a litigant is entitled to such relief, legal or equitable, as his-showing justifies; and, without regard to any distinction between the powers of courts of law and equity as to the setoff of judgments, in every ease the suitor has the right to ask for the setoff, and in every proper case, as of right, the motion should be granted.
Id.—Assignment of Thing in Action—Notice—Subjection to Setoff— Unsatisfied Judgment.—An unsatisfied judgment is a thing in action within the meaning of section 368 of the Code of Civil • Procedure, which provides that “in case of an assignment of a thing in action, the action is without prejudice to any setoff or other defense existing at the time of or before notice to him of the assignment.” The assignee of such a judgment takes it cum onere, subject to all right of setoff affecting it which the judgment debtor had or might acquire before notice to him of the assignment.
Id.—Setoff Between Assignees.—A defendant who had acquired an existing judgment in favor of a third person against tne plaintiff prior to the rendition of the plaintiff’s judgment against him, and who had given notice of a motion to offset it against plaintiff’s judgment, prior to notice of the assignment thereof to the plaintiff’s attorney, is entitled to the setoff.
Id.—Right of Appeal fbom Judgment—Consent—Execution Unsatisfied.—The right of appeal from a judgment cannot be cut off by any offset thereof, but where the judgment for the plaintiff sought to he offset by another judgment against him purchased by the defendant was rendered by consent of the plaintiff, his right of appeal therefrom is gone, and if execution has been returned unsatisfied upon the other judgment and no appeal is pending, or appears to be proposed therefrom, the offset may be . allowed.
In.—Pendency of Appeal—Retention of Motion.—The pendency of an appeal at the time of the motion to offset the judgments is not ground for denial of the motion, but would be cause for the court’s retaining the motion until the final decision upon the appeal.
HENSHAW, J. The action was for slander, and plaintiff recovered. Two appeals are before this court, the one (S. F. No. 863) from the judgment, the other (S. F. No. 862) from an order given after judgment.
1. Upon appeal from the judgment, the only contention argued is that the complaint fails to state a cause of action, in that [159]it nowhere avers that the words uttered and published of plaintiff by defendant were false. The complaint alleged: “That heretofore, on the twenty-sixth day of December, A. D. 1894, the defendant spoke, in the hearing of C. C. Loomis, J. P. McElroy, Thomas Grossman, and sundry other persons, of and concerning the plaintiff, the false and scandalous words following, to wit: ‘Did you know that Haskins was an embezzler?’ ‘Why, he is; he was arrested at San Diego and tried by jury, and only escaped because the jury disagreed; the jury stood eight for conviction to four for acquittal.’ ‘He was arrested for stealing tools.’ ‘Haskins is a thief, and I will put him where ho belongs.’ ”
“Slander is a false and unprivileged publication other than libel which charges any person with a crime,” et cetera. (Civ. Code, sec. 46.) That the words the publication of which was charged against defendant were slanderous, if false, there can be no doubt. The averment that defendant spoke “the false and scandalous words following” was a sufficient allegation of their falsity to pass a general demurrer. (Amestoy v. Electric etc. Co., 95 Cal. 311; Alexander v. McDow, 108 Cal. 25.)
3. Judgment for plaintiff in this action was given upon May 15, 1896. Defendant moved for a new trial, and the court granted the motion, provided plaintiff did not within ten days consent to a reduction of the judgment to three hundred dollars and costs. Defendant accepted the reduction, and judgment was entered accordingly upon December 4, 1896. Meanwhile one Crossman had obtained a judgment against this plaintiff upon January 13, 1896, for the sum of seven hundred and thirty dollars and costs, and upon June 1, 1896, hadassigned this judgment to the defendant Jordan. Upon June 9, 1896, Jordan gave notice of the assignment to John E. Aitken, who was the attorney for Crossman in the Crossman suit, and one of his attorneys in the present action, and he likewise moved the substitution of himself as plaintiff in the place of Crossman in that litigation.
On December 8, 1896, four days after the entry of the judgment in this action, Jordan served notice upon plaintiff’s attorneys of his motion to set off the judgment in the Crossman suit against the judgment adverse to him in the present action. Up
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