Nelson v. Merced County

California Supreme Court Dec 13, 1898 No. Sac. No. 406Published

Before: Haynes

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Holding. The court held that the one-year statute of limitations for filing claims against a county under the County Government Act of 1893 begins to run from the date the last item of an account accrues, rather than applying to each individual item separately.

Issues

Whether the one-year limitation period for filing claims against a county applies to each individual item of a claim or to the claim as a whole based on the date of the last item.
Whether the trial court erred in limiting the plaintiff's recovery to only those items that accrued within one year prior to the presentation of the claim.

Disposition. reversed and remanded

Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion

“The limitation imposed by said section does not begin to run until the date at which the last item accrued; and the claim may be allowed if presented at any time within a year after that date.”

“The statute nowhere fixes a time for the payment of per diem compensation of officers. All employment by the day, under the same contract, at a stipulated compensation, is the proper subject of an account to be embraced in a single cause of action.”

Synopsis

Pleading—General Demurrer—Statute op Limitations.—Where but one cause oí action is stated in a complaint, if a recovery can be bad for any part of the claim, a general demurrer thereto, for want of facts, and that the cause of action is barred by the statute of limitations, should not be sustained in part, but should be overruled with leave to answer.

Id.—Answer—Plea op Statute—Waiver op Error—Presumption of Consent.—Where a demurrer to the complaint was erroneously sustained in part, and an answer was filed pleading the statute of' limitations, as to part of the claim, upon which a trial was had without objection, with tne same result as that of the order upon, the demurrer, the plaintiff is not prejudiced by the erroneous-ruling thereupon, and it will be presumed upon appeal-that the answer was filed by consent, and the judgment thereafter rendered is not affected by the irregularity.

County—Claim op Supervisor—Per Diem—Service as Boad Commissioner—Limitation.—A claim of a Supervisor against a county of the thirty-ninth class for his regular per diem for services rendered-while acting as road commissioner, covering a period of three years, is not barred by section 41 of the County Governmeint Act, as to that portion of the claim preceding one year from the date of its presentation, if presented within one year after the last item of the account or claim accrued.

Id.—Statutes op Limitation- -Construction.—Statutes of limitations are to be construed strictly, and the court must find the intention of the legislature in the statute itself.

Id.—Per Diem Compensation—Account—Single Cause of Action.— Where the statute does not fix a time for the payment of the per diem compensation of a supervisor, such per diem is the proper subject of an account to be embraced in a single cause of action, and to- be presented as one itemized claim to the board' of supervisors.

HAYNES, C. Plaintiff brought this action to recover front [645]"the county of Merced eighteen hundred and eighty-four dollars, :for services rendered hy the plaintiff as supervisor of said county while acting as road commissioner in his district. His claim for said services, itemized and verified as required by law, was duly-filed and presented to the board of supervisors May 19, 1896, and by said board referred to the district attorney, who indorsed thereon the following disapproval:

“The annexed claim is disapproved. The reason for disapproval being that claimant has already received compensation in full from Merced county for the services rendered hy him as road commissioner during all the times mentioned in this claim. Also for the reason that all that portion .of the claim for services rendered prior to May 19, 1895, is barred hy the provisions of the County Government Act. (Statutes 1893, sec. 41.)”

The claim was thereupon rejected by the board of supervisors; and this action was brought.

The first charge in the itemized account is dated February 1, 1893, and the last is April 29, 1896, and it was filed with the clerk of the board May 19, 1896.

Under the act of 1893 Merced was a county of the thirty-ninth class, and by section 201, subdivision 15, the compensation of supervisors in counties of that class is fixed at “six dollars per day for each day while in service of the county” (Stats. 1893, p. 497), and it is conceded that supervisors of said county were entitled to that compensation for each day’s service as road commissioner.

The complaint consists of one count or cause of action covering the entire claim, and defendant demurred thereto: 1. For want of sufficient facts; 2, that it is barred by section 41 of the 'County Government Act of 1893; 3. That it is haired by section 338 of the Code of Civil Procedure; and, 4. That it is barred by section 339 of the same code. Upon the hearing of the demurrer the following order was made: “It is ordered that the demurrer herein he and the same is sustained as to all items of the account prior to one year before the filing of claim.”

No judgment was entered upon this order, and afterward the ■defendant answered and admitted that plaintiff performed the .services alleged in the complaint, but denied that defendant was indebted to the plaintiff on account thereof in said sum of

Nelson v. Merced County

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