People v. Cuff
Before: Garoutte
Synopsis
Criminal Law—Instruction—Power to Produce Stronger Evidence.— An instruction based upon subdivisions 6 and 7 of section 2061 of the Code of Civil Procedure, in reference to the effect of the failure of a party to produce stronger and more satisfactory evidence than that offered when in his power to do so, ought rarely, if ever, to be given in a criminal case in which the jury are the sole and exclusive judges of the weight of evidence; and if the only plausible application of such an instruction is to the failure of the defendant to testify in his own behalf, it is prejudicially erroneous.
Id.—Attempt to Kill by Poison—Evidence—Collateral Facts.—Upon the trial of a defendant charged with an attempt to kill a person named by the administration of poison, consisting of strychnia, the evidence of which was circumstantial, evidence of collateral facts, tending to connect the defendant with other events and offenses of a different character and in relation to other persons, occurring some time previous to the offense charged, which did not in any appreciable decree tend to show a motive for the attempted murder, is inadmissible.
Id.—Purchase oe Chloroform by Defendant.—It may be proved that chloroform was purchased by the defendant, and was in bis possession when arrested, as tending to show to some degree his intention toward the person to whom poison was administered.
Id.—Conversations with Defendant—False Explanations.—Conversations had with the defendant by a witness, in which he gave false reasons for being in the place where the poison was administered, on the day of its administration, are relevant and competent evidence for the prosecution.
Id.—Motive of Offense—Rivalry of Suitors—Evidence that the defendant was an unsuccessful rival of the person poisoned, and a persistent suitor for the hand of a young lady to whom the person poisoned was engaged to be married, and that that person had seen one who resembled the defendant in company with her and another young lady prior to the date of the poisoning, is admissible as tending to show a motive for the alleged crime. Id.—Reprehensible Details Inadmissible.—The rivalry of the suitor should only be sho-wn generally; and it was not admissible to prove reprehensible details of the defendant’s courtship.
Id.—Purchase and Possession of Strychnia—Rebutting Evidence.— After -proof by the prosecution of the purchase of strychnia by the defendant, and his possession of it when arrested for the crime of administering it with intent to kill, it is error to exclude rebutting evidence tending to show that defendant was a farmer, and that the farmers generally in the neighborhood where he resided purchased strychnia, and had it in their possession for the purpose of poisoning “varmints.”
GAROUTTE, J. The defendant has been convicted of a felony, alleged to have consisted in an attempt to kill one Miller by [591]administering poison. The evidence is entirely circumstantial, but tends to show that defendant surreptitiously placed the poison, strychnia, in the sugar bowl out of which Miller was in the habit of using sugar, and out of which, in fact, upon this eventful day he used sugar, and nearly died as a result. The evidence is sufficient to support a finding of fact that Miller suffered from strychnia poisoning, and that defendant was the instrument by which it was administered. The case is one of circumstantial evidence alone, and the prosecution at the trial relied upon innumerable and somewhat minute circumstances to establish the two aforesaid salient facts. The defendant pleaded not guilty, and, in addition to denying the commission of the act, claimed that he was insane at the time.
The following instruction of the court should not have bjeen given to the jury: “The court instructs you that the evidence is to be estimated, not only by its own intrinsic weight, but also according to the evidence which it is in the power of one side to produce and of the other to contradict, and, therefore, that if weaker and less satisfactory evidence is offered, when it appears that stronger and more satisfactory was within the power of the party, the evidence offered should be viewed with distrust.” The basis for this instruction is found in section 2061 of the Code of Civil Procedure, subdivisions 6 and 7. We have had occasion in the past to examine various subdivisions of this section, and to point out the error of applying the principles' there declared to cases indiscriminately. (Kaufmann v. Maier, 94 Cal. 283; People v. O’Brien, 96 Cal. 180.) Indeed, as to subdivisions 4, 6 and 7 of the section, upon the trial of criminal cases it were best they should not be noticed, for, as generally applied, they trench upon the constitutional rights of the defendant in depriving him of a verdict rendered by jurors who are the sole and exclusive judges of the weight and effect of evidence. The danger lurking in these subdivisions of the section is found in the fact that they attempt to deal with the weight and effect of evidence—matters for the jury and not matters for legislative action. The aforesaid section of the code declares that the principles stated in the various subdivisions thereof may be given by the court to the jury upon all proper occasions. In criminal cases the proper occasions are so few and the improper occasions are so many that it were best they should be given rarely, if at all. The instruc
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