Crocker v. Cunningham
Before: Harrison
Synopsis
■Cropping Contract—Division op Grain—Attachment Against Cropper. Under a cropping contract by the terms of which the entire crop of grain raised was to belong to the owner of the land until division should be made, and one-half of the crop was to be segregated 'on the ground, to be given to the cropper at the conclusion of the threshing and sacking of the crop, where it appeared that all of the crop, excepting one stack, had been threshed and sacked, and one-half thereof delivered by the cropper to the order of the owner of the land, and the remaining half remained in the field, such remaining half of the threshed and sacked crop is to be deemed the property of the cropper, and is subject to attachment by his creditor.
Id.—Construction of Contract—Division of Threshed Part op Crop.— Under the provision in the contract that one-half of the crop was to be segregated on the ground for the cropper, at the conclusion of the threshing and sacking of the crop, the parties could have postponed the division and segregation until the whole crop was threshed and sacked; but they were not required to do so, and might divide the threshed and sacked portion thereof, though another portion thereof was still unthreshed.
Id.—Bill op Sale—Change op Possession.—A bill of sale made by the cropper to the owner of the land for a valuable consideration, but without any act purporting to be a delivery or change of possession of the sacks segregated on the ground to the cropper, could not affect the right of the creditor of the cropper to attach the same.
Id.—Security for Advances—Waiver of Bight.—A provision in the contract that the owner of the land might retain possession of the cropper’s half of the crop as security for advances, cannot be enforced against the claims of the creditors of the cropper, while such half remains in the cropper’s possession; and the division and segregation to him of his half of the crop is to be regarded as a surrender of the right to retain the same as security.
HARRISON, J. Action of claim and delivery to recover from defendant, as sheriff of the county of San Joaquin, certain grain held by him under a writ of attachment against one John Enos;
By the terms of an agreement between the plaintiffs and Enos, commonly called a cropping contract, Enos agreed to perform the labor required for the cultivation in grain during the year ending September, 1896, of a tract of land on Boberts Island, in-San Joaquin county, belonging to the plaintiffs, and at the maturity of the crop to harvest and sack the same, and haul and deliver one-half thereof at such place on the river bank as the plaintiffs might direct. In consideration thereof the plaintiffs agreed to give to Enos one-half of the crop, the said one-half to-be segregated on the ground at the conclusion of the threshing and sacking of the grain. The agreement also contained a provision that the entire crop should remain the exclusive property of the plaintiffs until said one-half part should have been delivered to Enos in payment and satisfaction as aforesaid. During that year Enos raised upon the land the grain in controversy, with other grain, and on the 23d of July all of the grain, with the exception of one stack of wheat, had been threshed and sacked, and one-half of it had been hauled by him to Erewert’s Landing upon the river bank for the plaintiffs, and under their direction, and the sacks were there marked “McLaughlin Company.” (The plaintiffs constitute the McLaughlin Company.) On that day there was remaining in the field the one thousand and fifty-six sacks of barley and one hundred and eighty-three sacks of wheat in controversy herein, together with the above stack of unthreshted wheat, -and the same was attached by the defendant, who was the sheriff of that county, as the property of John Enos, under a writ of attachment issued out of the superior court of that [549]■county in an action against him. The defendant had received a writ of attachment against Enos on the 18th day of July, and by virtue thereof had taken the grain into his possession on that day, •and on the 23d of July, while it was still in his possession, he made a levy upon it by virtue of the writ then issued, and the levy under the prior writ was subsequently released. At the trial, the jury, under the directions of the court, rendered a verdict in favor of the plaintiffs for the wheat that was in the unthreshed stack, and upon the evidence before them awarded to the defendant the right of possession for the one thousand •and fifty-six sacks of barley and the one hundred and eighty-three sacks of wheat. The plaintiffs have appealed from the judgment entered upon this portion of the verdict, and from an order denying their motion for a new trial.
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