Reclamation District No. 537 of Yolo County v. Burger
Before: Temple
Synopsis
Reclamation District—Organization—Jurisdiction of Supervisors.— The board of supervisors cannot acquire jurisdiction to organize a new reclamation district unless a petition therefor, purporting to bear the requisite number of signatures of the owners of one-half of the acreage of the district as organized, is presented to the board, in which case the board is authorized to determine and adjudicate questions of fact arising upon such petition.
Id.—Proceeding in Invitum—Enforcement of Assessment—Attack upon Corporation.—The organization of a reclamation district results in putting a burden on property against the will of the owners, and the requirements of the law as to such a proceeding cannot be evaded by calling it a corporation; and in an action to enforce an assessment levied by the district, if its organization is denied, the question is not whether the district has so acted as to become a corporation de facto, but whether there has been in fact a substantial compliance with the law, and the exercise of jurisdiction by the board of supervisors • to determine facts presented before it by a petition sufficient in form and purporting to be sufficiently signed.
Id.—Signature by Administratrix—Adjudication by Supervisors.— Though the administratrix of an estate is not competent as such to sign a petition for the organization of a reclamation district, yet if the petition was otherwise sufficient, and did not show that one of the signers was an administratrix of any estate, but merely showed that the word “administratrix” was appended to her signature, the question of her ownership was one of fact, upon which the determination of the board was conclusive; and no proof to the contrary is competent.
Id.—Assessment—Proportion to Benefits—Evidence—Opinions.—In an action by a reclamation district to enforce an assessment, it is not competent to ask witnesses for their opinions, upon the precise issue being tried by the court, as to whether the assessment as made constituted a charge upon each tract in proportion to benefits; but if such questions were allowed, the opposing party, upon cross-examination, would be entitled to ask upon what the opinion was based.
Id.—Improper Assessment—Old Levee.—An assessment by a reclamation district to pay for an old levee used as part of the plan of reclamation, so as to credit each owner with the estimated value of that part of the levee which was upon his land, at twelve and one-half cents per cubic yard, it appearing that a break in the levee at any point would flood the whole district, and that work on any part of the levee was of as much benefit to any other landowner as to him upon whose land the work was done, and that no two tracts were assessed alike, or in proportion to the altitude of the land, is not in proportion to benefits, and cannot be sustained.
TEMPLE, J. This suit is by a reclamation district to collect an assessment. The appeal is from a refusal of a new trial. It is denied that the district was duly organized, and that the assessment was in proportion to benefits.
The alleged defect in organization is that the petition was not signed by the owners of one-half of the acreage of the district. After the petition had been presented and had been published, the board. organized the district, excluding therefrom about three hundred acres, which was included in the district as described in the petition. It is admitted that the petition does contain the signatures of the owners of one-half of the land in the district, as reformed. It is contended that the board of supervisors cannot thus give themselves jurisdiction by forming a new district in which a majority of acreage would be represented on the petition. This position is certainly sound. A petition with the requisite number of signatures must be presented before the board can act in the matter at all.
The proceeding results in putting a burden upon property against the will of the owners, and the requirements as to proceedings of that character cannot be evaded by calling the governmental agency through which the proceeding is conducted a corporation. As remarked in People v. Reclamation Dist. 551, 117 Cal. 114, the proceeding greatly resembles those in which property is assessed for local improvements in proportion to benefits, and I see no reason why the same rules as to essential requirements should not apply. The board of supervisors is required to inquire and determine whether the petition is sufficiently signed. So far as this depends upon a fact to be deter[444]mined, their conclusion may be final as an adjudication, but the question is not whether the district has so acted as to constitute a corporation de facto. (Lower Kings River etc. Dist. v. Phillips, 108 Cal. 306.) If, upon due notice and a petition sufficient in form, the parties have been afforded an opportunity to be heard before a competent tribunal, they have had due process according to the law of the land, and are concluded. They cannot be deprived of their property without such hearing, or opportunity to be heard, by proof of the existence of a corporation de facto. There must have been, in fact, a substantial compliance with the law.
Plaintiff does not concede that the petition as presented was defective, or that it did not have the required number of signers. The number of acres represented by each signer is stated in the petition, and one of the petitioners signs as administratrix. Deducting the amount represented by this signer, there would not be enough laud represented to give the board jiirisdiction. It is conceded that an administrator would not be a competent petitioner under the law, but the petition does not show that the person so signing was administratrix of any estate. The petition only shows that the word was affixed to her signature. This is ambiguous, and no proof of the real fact was offered at the trial, and if offered would not have been competent. The question was, after all, one of fact, upon which the determination of the board has been held conclusive.
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