People v. Griffith
Before: Temple
Synopsis
Criminal Daw — Obtaining Money under False Pretenses— Pleading—Falsity op Representations—Negative Pregnant. An indictment for obtaining money under false pretenses, consisting of representations that defendant “was the owner of and in the possession of a certain tract of land,” and had a right to lease it, in which a denial of the truth of the representations is made by a negative pregnant, averring that the defendant “in fact and in truth was not the owner of and in the possession of” the said tract of land, is insufficient to negative the ownership or right of possession of the land, or to overcome the presumption of innocence, and a demurrer thereto should be sustained.
Id—False Pretense op Right to Lease—Conclusion op Law.— The representation that defendant had the right to lease the land, having been expressly made to depend upon the fact of the ownership and possession of the land, is a conclusion of law, and an allegation of its falsity cannot render the indictment sufficient, the falsity of the representation as to the ownership not having been properly pleaded.
Id.—Representations in Letters—Venue not Shown—Presumption upon Appeal.—The representations complained of having been made in letters sent by mail, and no evidence appearing in the record upon appeal as to where any of them were mailed, or received, and the verdict having been assailed as contrary to the evidence, it must be presumed upon appeal that the bill of exceptions contains all the evidence tending to prove every material fact for the prosecution, and the judgment must be reversed for want of proof of the venue.
Id.—Title in Third Person—Disputed Rights—Bona Fide Claim of Dependant—Question por Jury—Though any beneficial right of the defendant in land, the legal title to which was in the name of a third person, was in dispute, and though, on the theory of the beneficial ownership thereof claimed by the defendant, such third person presumptively took both the title and the rents of the land as security for debts due to other parties, and the defendant does not appear to have had a right of possession until such debts were paid, yet it was for the jury to determine whether the defendant, in claiming the ownership and right to lease the land, was acting in good faith, according to what he believed was his right; and if so, he was guilty of no crime.
TEMPLE, J. The defendant was convicted of the offense of obtaining money by false and fraudulent representations, and ap- ■ peals from the judgment and from an order refusing a new trial.
The indictment was demurred to, and among other points made, it is contended that it does not charge an offense because, after stating what the representations were, it does not contain a sufficient allegation that such representations were false. The representations are stated to have been: “That he, the said W. G. Griffith, was the owner of and in the possession of a certain tract of land situate, lying, and being in the county of Sonoma, known as the Robert Miller Mountain or Hill ranch; that he, W. G. Griffith, by reason of his said ownership and possession of said Robert Miller Mountain or Hill ranch, had full authority and right to let, lease, and demise the said Robert Miller Mountain or Hill ranch to the said C. B. Petray.”
The falsity of the representation is alleged as follows: “At the time that said W. G. Griffith represented and pretended to the said Petray that he was the owner of said Robert Miller Mountain or Hill ranch, and had full authority and right to let, lease, and demise the same to C. B. Petray, he, the said W. G. Griffith, in fact and in truth was not the owner of and in the possession of the said Robert Miller Mountain or Hill ranch, and had no authority or right to let, lease and demise the same to the said C. B. Petray, all of which was then and there well known,” et cetera.
[214].The representation that defendant had a right to lease the land is not only a conclusion of law, hut was represented to depend upon the fact that he was the owner and in possession. Now, the denial of the truth of the representation is a negative pregnant. It does not deny that defendant owned the land; nor does it deny that he was in possession; hut it avers that in truth the defendant was not the owner and in possession. This might he so, and yet the defendant might have been the owner, and as owner have the right to lease the land, although not in possession. In such ease possession would be immaterial. Or the defendant may have been rightfully in possession, and entitled to the possession, in which case the' matter of ownership would be immaterial.
The indictment must negative the presumption of innocence. If the allegations can be true and the defendant still be innocent, the presumption still prevails, and a verdict of guilty as charged would not constitute a conviction- of a crime. This indictment must therefore be held insufficient.
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