Maxson v. Llewelyn
Before: Henshaw
Synopsis
Fraud—Circumstantial Evidence.—Fraud may In all cases be proved by circumstantial evidence; and in aid of the direct facts proved, legitimate inferences are permitted to be indulged to establish other facts not directly in evidence.
Id.—False Representations—Reasonable Ground for Belief.— Where a man makes a representation in the reasonable belief that it is true, fraud will not be imputed to him if it afterward be shown to be untrue; but there must be reasonable grounds for his belief, and if neither his belief of its truth, nor a reasonable ground for such belief, is made to appear, fraud in making the false representation may be inferred from circumstances indicating it.
Life Insurance—False Representations by Agent—Defense to Check for Premium—Sufficiency of Proof.—In an action by a managing agent of a life insurance company upon a check given for the first premium upon a policy of life insurance, which was defended on the ground of false representation, made by the special agent who secured the application, as to the favorable nature of the policy to be given, where no belief or reasonable ground for belief of the special agent in the truth of the representations was shown, and it appeared that the policy returned did not conform to the policy represented, and that it was highly improbable that an insurance company doing business legitimately would use such a policy as that represented, the circumstances are sufficient to justify the inference of the fraudulent character of the representations.
Id.—Application -in Writing—Parol Evidence of Fraud.—It appearing that the special agent prepared the application, and that its nature was not understood by the applicant, and was not readily understandable by one not versed in insurance matters, the fact that it was in writing, and that the policy conformed thereto, does not preclude parol evidence of false and fraudulent representations made by the special agent concerning the policy, and that the signature of the applicant was secured by misrepresentation and fraud sufficient to vitiate the transaction.
Id.—Check Payable to Special Agent—Ownership of Company-Action by Managing Agent—Support of Finding.—In an action by the managing agent personally upon a check drawn by the applicant in favor of the special agent for the amount of the first premium, payable four months after date, a finding that the plaintiff did not purchase the check for value before maturity, or at all, but took it as agent for the insurance company, which was its owner and holder, is supported by evidence that, upon delivery of the policy and its immediate return by the applicant, as not being according to the understood terms, the managing agent wrote to the applicant that the application and check when received by him “immediately became the property of the company, and could not be recalled.”
HENSHAW, J. Plaintiff appeals from the judgment and from the order denying him a new trial. He brought his action against the defendant Llewelyn as maker, and defendant George Larrabee as indorser, to recover upon a negotiable instrument in the form of a check.
Larrabee was a special or soliciting agent of the Mutual Life Insurance Company of Hew York, of which corporation Maxson was the manager for Southern California. The check was given by Llewelyn in payment of the first year’s premium upon a life insurance policy to be issued by the company to him. By its terms the check was made payable upon a day after the date upon which it was agreed the policy should be delivered. Plaintiff pleaded that he was the owner of the check, and that he had purchased it for value before maturity. For answer the defendant made denial, and set up facts constituting misrepresentation and fraud in the procurement of the check, and showing at least a partial failure of consideration. He also averred that plaintiff took the check with knowledge of these facts.
TJpon the trial, he proved that Larrabee represented to him ■ that his company would issue an exceptionally and peculiarly [197]favorable policy to him for the sake of other business which it hoped thereby to gain. Defendant signed a written application for a policy, and, not understanding its terms, was assured, in answer to his question, that this particular application would bring the policy agreed upon. Llewelyn thereupon gave his check for five hundred and sixty dollars, payable to Larrabee, but payable upon April 20, 1896. The application was signed and the check delivered upon December 20, 1895. The policy was to follow some time in January, 1896. Larrabee agreed that, if the policy was not as represented, the check would be returned. The policy which was issued was such a policy as was called for by the application, but in essential particulars was a different policy, and one less favorable to the insured than that which Larrabee had represented. Upon January 20, 1896, the defendant Llewelyn received the policy from the plaintiff Max-son. He returned it the same day, with a letter stating that the policy was not in accordance with the understood terms. Upon January 23d Maxson again sent the policy to Llewelyn, and in his accompanying letter said: “I return the policy herewith and shall hold you for its payment.....Tour check, application, and receipt for check were all dated December 20th. Application and- check were in my hands on the 21st of December and immediately became the property of the company and could not be recalled.” Llewelyn once more returned the policy and re- . fused payment of the premium.
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