Christian v. Superior Court of San Diego County
Before: Temple
Synopsis
Jurisdiction of Superior Court—Construction of Constitution —Exclusion of Compound Interest.—Section 6 of article IT of the constitution, limiting the jurisdiction of the superior court to “cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest, amounts to three hundred dollars,” excludes all compound, as well as simple interest, from the demand.
3d.—Interest Made Part of Principal—Judgment—Whit of Review.—A stipulation in a note, the original principal of which is less than three hundred dollars, that unpaid interest is “to become part of the principal and to bear like interest until paid,” will not permit the addition of unpaid interest to the principal to confer jurisdiction upon the superior court; and a judgment rendered therein upon such note is void, and will be annulled upon writ of review.
TEMPLE, J. This is a proceeding upon a writ of review wherein it is contended by the petitioner that a certain judgment entered by the superior court of San Diego county is void for want of jurisdiction.
On the fourth day of April, 1895, an action was commenced in the superior court of the county of San Diego against the petitioner and one B. Dougherty to collect the amount due upon a. promissory note in the words and figures following:
“$300. San Diego, Cal., Oct. 10, 1890.
“Six months after date, without grace, for value received, we-promise to pay to the order of W. P. Walters, the sum of two hundred dollars, with interest thereon from this date until payment at the rate of one and one-quarter per cent per month, payable-quarterly, and, if not so paid, then to become part of the principal of this note, and to bear like rate of interest till paid. Both principal and interest to be paid in United States gold coin. And we further agree that in the event of suit brought against -then and there shall be added to any judgment against us; rendered in said suit, as counsel fees, an additional sum of twenty per centum in like gold coin, upon the amount of principal and interest hereof accrued at the time of the entry of said judgment^ or if paid before judgment and after action commenced then on. the amount at the date of payment.
“E. DOUGHERTY,
“H. T. CHRISTIAN.” ■
In the complaint it was averred that the only payments which had been made upon the note were the following, on account of interest: May 13, 1891, fifteen dollars, November 7, 1891,. fifteen dollars, and February 35, 1893, ten dollars. It was also-alleged that there was due on the note as principal the sum of twro hundred dollars, with interest, compounded monthly, from the tenth day of May, 1893, at the rate of one and one-quarter per cent per month. The amount due on the note when the action was commenced for principal and interest which had been, thus compounded was three hundred and nine dollars.
[119]In section 6 of article IY of the constitution, superior courts are given jurisdiction of eases in which the demand, exclusive of interest, amounts to three hundred dollars, and in section 11’ of the same article it is provided that the powers and duties of justices of the peace shall not trench upon the jurisdiction of other courts, except as there specified, which exception does not affect this contention. The question, therefore, is, whether the superior court or justice’s court have jurisdiction in an action upon a note, originally for less than three hundred dollars, but which by compounding the interest has created a new principal (if it can be so regarded), amounting to more than three hundred dollars.
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