West Coast Lumber Co. v. Knapp
Before: Temple
Synopsis
Mechanics’ Liens—Building Contract—Maturity of Deferred Payment.—A building contract, providing that the last payment “shall be made within thirty-six days after this contract is fulfilled,” does not make the last payment due until the expiration of the thirty-six days; and the privilege of the owner to pay the contractor before its expiration does not render the contract void, so that materialmen and mechanics are thereby' let in for the full amount of their demands, regardless of the contract price.
Id.—Construction of Statute—Penalty.—The provisions of section 1184 of the Code of Civil Procedure, requiring that “at least twenty-five per cent of the whole contract price shall be made payable at least thirty-five days after the final completion of the contract,” and providing that “no payment made prior to the time when the same is due under the contract shall be valid for the purpose of defeating, diminishing or discharging any liens,” etc., in so far as they have the effect to make the owner pay more than he has agreed to pay are penal, and should be strictly construed in favor of the owner, and against the exaction of the , penalty, if in reason they can be.
Id.—Popular Sense of Words—Meaning of “Due.”—The words of the statute are to be understood in their popular sense, as applied to deferred payments, which cannot be said to be “due” until the creditor can rightfully demand payment. So understood, a contract allowing the debtor a fixed period within which to make the payment, does not make the debt “due” until the expiration of that period, and does not violate the statute.
Id.—Identification oe Dbawings and Specifications—Incomplete Contbact—Execution.—A building contract reciting that the material was to be furnished and the work done in accordance with drawings and specifications “identified by the signature of the parties hereto,” is incomplete and invalid, if no such signed drawings and specifications are to be found. In such case, the whole contract is not reduced to writing and signed by the parties, as required by the statute.
Id.—Becobd of Unsigned Plans Attached to Contbact—Plan of Building—The fact that unsigned plans and specifications not referred to in the contract were attached to the contract, and the whole filed as one document, and that the house was actually built in accordance with such plans, can have no bearing upon the question whether the whole contract was reduced to writing and signed by the parties, in compliance with the statute.
Id.—Matebialmen—Estoppel—Refebenoe to Unsigned Plans.— Materialmen are not estopped from enforcing their liens under the claim that the incomplete contract was void, for want of signature to the plans and specifications referred to in the contract, by the mere fact that they contracted to furnish lumber and made out bills with express reference to the unsigned plans and specifications attached to the contract, it not appearing that the owner was thereby misled or induced to change his position, or that knowledge of the invalidity of the contract was suppressed by them while dealing with the contractor.
TEMPLE, J. Defendants appeal from the judgment and from an order denying a new trial in an action brought to foreclose liens of materialmen. Two points are made, based upon-the following allegations in the complaint: “That said contract does not provide that at least twenty-five per cent of the whole contract price shall he payable at least thirty-five days after the final completion of the contract, as by statute in such eases made and provided; that the drawings and specifications referred to in said contract were never identified by the signature of the [81]parties to said contract as provided in said contract should be done.”
The contract provides that the last payment "shall be made' within thirty-six days after this contract is fulfilled.” It is said that under this provision the payment is due at any time within-the period of thirty-six days that the owners may be willing to-make the payment, although by the terms of the contract payment could not have been compelled.
The materiality of the point arises from provisions in sections 1183 and 1184 of the Code of Civil Procedure,requiring the contract to be in writing and filed in the recorder’s office before the work is commenced, and that twenty-five per cent of the contract price shall be made payable at least thirty-five days after the final completion of the contract, and which contains the following: “Ko payment made prior to the time when the same is due under the terms and conditions of the contract shall be valid for the purpose of defeating or diminishing any lien,” et cetera: Therefore, it is contended, according to the terms of the contract the payments may become due before the lapse of thirty-five days after the completion of the contract; that such payment would not then be void under the provision above quoted; and that the contract, therefore, does not comply with the statute, and is void, and the materialmen are let in to the full amount of their demands, regardless of the contract price.
So fas as the statute has the effect of compelling the owner to pay more than he has agreed to pay, or to pay his debt twice, it is highly penal, and should be strictly construed in his favor. Those who seek to inflict upon him a penalty for his failure to comply with the terms of the law must show clearly that the dereliction has occurred. The law must be construed against the-exaction of the penalty, if in reason it can be.
I think a debt cannot be said to be due until the creditor can rightfully demand and insist upon payment. This is the usual and conventional meaning of the language as applied to deferred payments. Unless the money is put out upon interest, and the creditor is making a profit by having it kept out, it will be presumed that he will accept payment whenever it is tendered. The extended credit in such a case is wholly for the benefit of the payor. The contractor, laborers, and materialmen in a building
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