Avakian v. Noble

California Supreme Court Jun 15, 1898 No. Sac. No. 152Published

Before: Fleet

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Holding. The court held that a complaint alleging trespass in general terms is sufficient to support a verdict for punitive damages when the defendant fails to demur and the case is tried on the theory that such damages are at issue. Furthermore, an employer is liable for the malicious acts of an agent if the employer, with full knowledge of the circumstances, retains the benefits of the agent's actions, thereby ratifying them.

Issues

Whether a complaint alleging trespass in general terms is sufficient to support a verdict for punitive damages in the absence of a special demurrer.
Whether an employer is liable for the malicious acts of an agent when the employer retains the fruits of the agent's actions with full knowledge of the circumstances.

Disposition. affirmed

Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion

“after verdict, the intendments are in favor of the sufficiency of the pleading.”

Synopsis

Trespass — Oppression — Exemplary Damages — Pleading — Certainty— Waiver of Objection__A complaint alleging a forcible and oppressive ■; trespass should' allege specifically and with certainty the circumstances showing oppression or malice in the doing of the act complained of, in order to entitle the plaintiff to damages in excess .of ' ' the actual value of the property taken; but where the facts were - - .alleged in general terms, and no demurrer was interposed for úncertainty or ambiguity, and' it appears from the record on appeal that the trial proceeded -upon the theory that the complaint was sufficient to bring the case within the provisions of section 3294 of the Civil Code, and that evidence was admitted without objection showing the circumstances of aggravation under which the property was taken, after a verdict in favor of the plaintiff for exemplary damages, all intendments are in favor of the sufficiency of the complaint, and objection to its sufficiency cannot be raised upon appeal for the first time.

Id.—Oepbessive and Malicious Tbespass of Agent—Ratification.—Where the circumstances show that a wanton, forcible, oppressive, and malicious trespass was committed by the agent of the defendant in seizing the property of the plaintiff, to which defendant had no right of possession, and that he was arrested for an assault upon the plaintiff and fined therefor, and the defendant, after being fully informed of all the facts and of the acts committed by the agent, refused to comply with a demand for the return of the prop- , erty so seized, the jury were warranted in finding that the defendant adopted and ratified the acts of the agent with full knowledge of all the circumstances attending the seizure, by retaining and accepting the fruits thereof. Such ratification, under the circumstances, was equivalent to express precedent authority for the wrongful acts committed, and justified a verdict against the defendant for exemplary damages.

VAN FLEET, J. Action to recover damages for a trespass ' committed by defendants in seizing and carrying away from plaintiffs’ possession a quantity of raisins. The substantive averments of the complaint are that while plaintiff was the owner and in possession, and entitled to possession, of a certain lot of raisins of the value of three hundred dollars, the defendants “unlawfully, oppressively, and with force and arms,” took and carried them away, to plaintiff’s damage in the sum of two thousand three hundred dollars.

The verdict was for plaintiff for the sum of five hundred and twenty-five dollars; and from a judgment entered thereon, and an order denying them a new trial, defendants appeal.

1. The first point made is, that the verdict was in excess of what plaintiff was entitled to recover under his complaint; that, being for a sum above the value of the raisins, as alleged, it is manifest that the jury, in addition to the actual damage suffered, awarded something by way of smart money or punitive damages for the wrong committed, while the facts stated do not authorize an award of punitive or exemplary damages.

It is quite obvious from the averments of the complaint that the purpose of the pleader was to allege facts bringing the case within section 3294 of the Civil Code, which provides: “In any action for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract, where the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice, actual or presumed, the jury, in addition to the actual damages, may give damages for the sake of example, and by way of punishing the defendant.”

It may be conceded that, as against a special demurrer for uncertainty or ambiguity, the complaint would be bad, and that plaintiff would have been required to allege in a more specific manner the circumstances showing oppression or malice in the doing of the act complained of in order to entitle him to damages in excess of the actual value of the property taken. (Mal[219]lory v. Thomas, 98 Cal. 644; Lamb v. Harbaugh, 105 Cal. 680.) But defendants interposed no such demurrer, and, after verdict, the intendments are in favor of the sufficiency of the pleading. The circumstances of the trespass are alleged in very general terms, it is true, hut it appears from the record that the trial proceeded upon the theory that the complaint was sufficient to bring the ease within the principles stated in the above provision of the code, and that, in accordance with that theory, evidence was admitted without- objection, showing the circumstances of aggravation under which the property was taken. In such a ease, the objection now made comes too late, and the complaint must be held sufficient to sustain the judgment.

Avakian v. Noble

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