Loustalot v. Calkins

GAROUTTE, J. This appeal is prosecuted from the judgment without a bill of exceptions. The action is brought upon a negotiable promissory note against A. C. Calkins, J. B. Liben, and J. W. Calkins, and a joint and several judgment was rendered against them. They now appeal and rely upon two grounds for a reversal of the judgment: 1. The demurrer of J. W. Calkins to the complaint should have been sustained; 2. The findings of the court are not sufficient to support the judgment.

The demurrer of J. W. Calkins declares there is a "misjoinder of parties defendant in that J. W. Calkins, an alleged and supposed guarantor, is joined with the principal promisors.” The complaint alleges that the defendants A. C. Calkins and J. B. Libeu made their certain promissory note in words and figures following: It is further alleged that defendant J. W. Calkins then and there indorsed said note in the following words, to wit: "Waiving notice and protest. J. W. Calkins,” "and that after the signing and indorsing of said note as aforesaid the said defendants did then and there deliver said promissory note to the plaintiff.” Section 3117 of the Civil Code provides: "One who indorses a negotiable instrument before it is delivered to the payee is hable to the payee thereon as an indorser.” Tested by this section of the code, the facts here alleged plainly place the defendant J. W. Calkins in the position of an indorser of the note. In [690]many jurisdictions he would be termed an anomalous or irregular indorser.

In speaking as to parties who may be joined as defendants, the Code of Civil Procedure, -section 383, declares: “Persons .severally liable upon the same obligation or instrument, including the parties to bills of exchange and promissory notes and sureties on the same or separate instruments, may all or any of them be included in the same action, at the option of the plaintiff.” By a liberal construction of this provision it may be fairly said that an indorser, such as this defendant Calkins, is a party to the promissory note. It is said in Riggs v. Waldo, 3 Cal. 487, 56 Am. Dec. 356: “Each one who, writes his name upon it is a party to it, and from its original character each party to it is an original undertaker.” The object of this section of the law is directed solely to the avoidance of a multiplicity of actions. And we see no substantial objection to the application of the rule to a case like the one at bar. Upon an examination of the authorities from other states having statutory provisions substantially similar to the one found in our code, we find those authorities preponderating to the effect that a guarantor and the maker of a promissory note may not be joined as parties defendant; but that question is not directly before us, and we pass it by for that reason. In this state from its earliest judicial history the makers and indorsers of negotiable promissory notes have been joined as parties defendant, and no question as to the correctness of the practice has ever been suggested. For this reason alone we feel constrained to give the statute a construction which it has tacitly borne for so many years. (See Riggs v. Waldo, supra; Pierce v. Kennedy, 5 Cal. 138; Ford v. Hendricks, 34 Cal. 673; Jones v. Goodwin, 39 Cal. 493; 2 Am. Rep. 473; Fessenden v. Summers, 62 Cal, 484; Young v. Miller, 63 Cal. 303.) The demurrer was properly overruled.