People v. Woon Tuck Wo
Before: McFarland
Synopsis
Criminal Law—Homicide—Trial—Remarks of Judge—Province of Jury. Remarks made by the judge upon the trial of a defendant accused of murder, concerning certain reporter’s notes offered in evidence, about which there was a dispute between the attorneys, to the ¡effect that the jury as sensible men would understand possible differences in the translation of Chinese into English, and that the jury would pass upon the facts and the whole of the testimony, and that it was for them to say what its value was, and what it pointed to, and what had been proved by it, do not constitute misconduct, or afford any ground for reversal of the judgment of conviction.
Id.—Evidence—Misleading Experiments.—W here several witnesses for the prosecution had testified that they saw the defendant shoot the deceased with a pistol, at the door of a house in a certain street about midnight of a certain day, and that they recognized him at and immediately after the time when the shot was fired, and the testimony was conflicting as to the condition oí the light at that time, and. it appeared there could be no substantial reproduction of the same conditions under which the witnesses testified that they recognized the defendant, evidence of experiments made three months afterward by a witness to show that he was unable to recognize any person, at the place where the homicide was alleged to have been committed, where the witnesses for the prosecution had stood at the time of the homicide, would have a tendency to confuse and mislead, rather than enlighten the jury, and was properly excluded.
Id.—Evidence of Experiments—Discretion.—Evidence of experiments is admissible, in proper cases, when they are shown to have been made under essentially the same conditions as those which existed in the-case on trial; .otherwise such evidence is not admissible for the reason that its tendency is to mislead and confuse the jury; but it is not proper to say that such evidence is not admissible on any ground, nor is it objectionable merely because remote in time, or because- ’ not a proper subject of expert or opinion evidence, or because not impeaching evidence, or as being hearsay. The admission or rejection of such evidence is largely within the discretion of the court;, and a case will not be reversed for an abuse of discretion by the court in rejecting such evidence, unless the evidence comes clearly within the principles' by which it is allowed.
Id.—Appeal—Points of Appellant—Assignment of Error not Argued.— Where assignments of error in the rulings of the court are stated by the appellant nakedly as points, by number, without any argument made or reason given why the rulings were erroneous, the court will not prosecute an independent inquiry in ord-Y to find out reasons for or against the correctness of the rulings.
McFARLAND, J. The defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree, the jury fixing his punishment at imprisonment for life. He appeals from the judgment and from an order denying his motion for a new trial.
1. Appellant contends for a reversal of the judgment on account of alleged misconduct of the court, which consisted of remarks made by the judge of the court at the trial concerning certain reporter’s notes. There were some differences between attorneys as to certain reporter’s notes which were offered in evidence, and the remarks of the court objected to were, substantially, simply that the jury as sensible men would understand possible differences in the translation of Chinese into English. These remarks were made incidentally during the progress of the trial, and were not given in the shape of a charge to the jury, and the court said that “the jury will pass on the facts and the whole of the testimony, and it is for them to say what its value is, and what it points to, and what has been proven by it.” Although the trial judge should be careful not to make unnecessary remarks about evidence in the course of a trial, still there was nothing in the incident to which appellant objects that would afford any ground for reversal of the judgment. It comes within the view stated in the opinion of this court in People v. Mayes, 113 Cal. 618.
2. Appellant contends that the court erred in sustaining the objections of the prosecution to what the appellant proposed, to [296]prove by the testimony of the witness, T. 0. McFarlane; and this objection presents the only question of importance in the case.
Several witnesses for the prosecution testified that they saw the defendant shoot the deceased with a pistol at or near the door of a house in the street called Waverly place, at or about twenty minutes after twelve o’clock midnight, on July 20, 1896. They testified that they recognized the defendant at and immediately after the time when the shot was fired; and one or two of them testified that they observed a scar on the face of the defendant, and also a peculiar cast of his eyes. The purpose of the offered evidence of McFarlane was to show that he had examined the premises on October 8, 1896, which was some three months after the homicide, and that he was unable to recognize any person at the place where the homicide is alleged to have been committed, when standing at the points where the witnesses for the prosecution had stood on the previous July 20th. He also offered to prove by a witness named Duifield, who had already testified in the case for defendant, that the condition of things was the same as existed on the 20th of July. This offered testimony was ruled out by the court.
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