Lees v. Colgan
Before: Garoutte, McFarland
Synopsis
Reward Offered by Governor—Apprehension of Murderer by Captain of Police—Official Duty—Public Policy.—A captain of police of the city and county of San Francisco, who apprehends a murderer in such city and county, for a murder committed in another county, makes the arrest of the murderer in the line of his official duty; and it is against sound public policy to allow such an officer to receive a reward offered by the governor of the state for the arrest and conviction of said murderer.
In.—Authority of Governor to Offer Rewarb.—Under section 1847 of the Civil Code, the authority of the governor to offer a reward is limited to the apprehension of certain criminals, and no importance can. be attached to services rendered in furnishing evidence to convict the criminal apprehended, though the reward offered by the governor purported to include conviction of the offender.
Id.—Compensation of Public Officer—Additional Reward not Allowable,—A public officer working for a fixed compensation, or whose fees, are prescribed by law, cannot demand or contract for a reward for services rendered in the line or scope of his public duty, either from, private parties, or from the state, or from any municipality.
In.—Power of Legislature—Construction of Statute—Authority of Governor.—Although the legislature has power to declare a public policy which has been declared unsound and vicious in every other jurisdiction, yet it will not he held to have taken such a step, unless the-intent is plainly manifest from the terms of the act; and the grant of mere power to the governor to offer a reward for the apprehension of criminals, does not carry an implied power to offer it to any and all persons, including public officers whose duty it is to make the arrest, but it will be construed to apply only to induce an arrest by private persons not under obligation to make such arrest.
Id.—Official Duty of Police Officer—Arrest of Criminals—Absence of Warrant.—A police officer of a city is made a peace officer by section 817 of the Penal Code, whose duty it is under section 836 of that code to make an arrest for a public offense committed in his presence, or when the person arrested has committed a felony, although not in his presence, or when a felony has been in fact committed, and he has reasonable cause for believing tiie person arrested to have committed it, and the fact that the arrest is made without a warrant, in no degree changes the legal complexion of the case, as it must -be assumed that there was reasonable cause for the arrest, and, if so, it was his duty to make it.
Id. — Consent of Police Commissioners to Reward — Construction of Charter.—Section 26 of the Consolidation Act of the city and county of San Francisco, providing that no police officer shall receive any present or reward for official services unless with the knowledge and approbation of a majority of the police commissioners, conceding it to be in force, whatever effect it may have as to other rewards cannot apply to the obtaining of a reward from the state, where the state stands upon its strict legal right, and is, through an authorized officer, objecting to the payment of such reward.
Opinion — Garoutte
GAROUTTE, J. This is an appeal from an order of the superior court directing the issuance of a writ of mandate to the state controller, requiring him to draw his warrant upon the state treasury in favor of petitioner for the sum of one thousand dollars. The application is based upon the following facts: Petitioner was a captain of police of the city and county of San Francisco. The governor of the state offered a reward of one thousand dollars for the arrest and conviction of the person or persons who murdered one Webber in the city of Sacramento. Petitioner arrested the murderer of Webber in tbe city and county of San Francisco, and furnished witnesses and evidence upon which a conviction was subsequently had. By right of these facts he now claims the reward of one thousand dollars. [265]There are other matters set forth in the petition for the writ, but we do not deem them material to the issue before us.
The governor of the state offered this reward by virtue of the authority found in section 1547 of the Penal Code, and that section declares:
“The governor may offer a reward not exceeding one thousand dollars, payable out of the general fund, for the apprehension:
“1.....2. Of any person who has committed or is charged with the commission of an offense punishable with death.”
It will be observed that the power of the governor is limited to offering rewards for the apprehension of certain criminals. For that reason we attach no importance to the allegations of the petition wherein it is declared that petitioner furnished the evidence upon which the murderer was convicted. It follows from what has already been said that the only question here presented is: May a police officer of the city and county of San Francisco, who arrests a murderer for a crime committed in another county of the state, and without a warrant, recover a reward offered by the state for the arrest of such murderer? The answer to this question is largely dependent upon the conclusion to be reached from two other propositions of law, namely: Was it the official duty of this captain of police to make the arrest of the criminal; and, if so, is it against sound public policy to allow such an officer to receive a reward for the performance ofJiis duty?
The last legal proposition stated must be declared in the affirmative. ' The courts, both in this country and England, are practically unanimous in declaring that a public officer working for a fixed compensation, or whose fees are prescribed bj law, cannot demand or contract for a reward for services rendered in the line or scope of his official duty. In the well-considered case, Matter of Russell, 51 Conn. 577, 50 Am. Rep. 55, it is said: “And no case can be found—at least I have not been able to find any—-in which the claim of a public officer to receive a reward for services rendered in the performance of his official duties has received the sanction of a court of last resort in this country or in England.” A deputy sheriff making an arrest in the line of his duty is not entitled to a reward offered for such arrest. (Stamper v. Temple, 6 Humph. 113; 44 Am. Dec. 296.)
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