Andrews v. Andrews
Before: McFarland
Synopsis
Divorce—Extreme Cruelty—Corroboration op Plaintiff—Construction of Code.—The main purpose of section 130 of the Civil Code, requiring corroboration of the parties in any action of divorce, is to prevent collusion; and where a divorce is sought on the ground of extreme cruelty, consisting of successive acts of ill-treatment, it is not necessary that there should be direct testimony of other witnesses to every act sworn to by the plaintiff, but it is sufficient corroboration if a considerable number of important and material facts are testified to by other witnesses, or if there is other evidence, circumstantial or direct, which strongly tends to strengthen and confirm the statements of the plaintiff.
In.—Extreme Cruelty not Closely Defined—Discretion of Trial Court. The code does not sharply define or make definite limitations of the phrase “extreme cruelty,” but merely describes it in general terms, and leaves a wide range of discretion in a trial court to the judge or jury.
Id.—Grievous Mental Suffering—Questions op Fact—Review of Findings.—The infliction of grievous mental suffering, independent of physical injury, may constitute extreme cruelty; and whether, in any particular case, the ill-treatment of the wife by the husband is so unusual as to be beyond that misconduct which may be attributed to the ordinary weaknesses and passions of men, and whether such treatment caused grievous mental suffering to the wife, are largely questions of fact to be determined by the trial court; and its findings thereupon cannot be disturbed upon appeal, unless the evidence in support of them is so slight as to indicate a want of ordinary good judgment and an abuse of discretion by the trial court.
Id.—Condonation—Renewal of Cruel Treatment.—The return of the wife to the husband after a course of cruel treatment, which caused her to leave him, does not establish a condonation, where it appears that the husband thereafter renewed his cruel treatment, and was repeatedly guilty of the same offenses which he had formerly committed.
McFARLAND, J. This is an action brought by a wife against her husband for a divorce, upon the ground of extreme cruelty. Judgment went for plaintiff, and defendant appeals from the judgment and from an order denying his motion for a new trial.
The facts averred as constituting extreme cruelty consist of many alleged cruel acts of appellant extending over a period of several years—such as calling her vile names, as “whore,” “liar,” “a damned liar,” “a damned old whore,” “a devil,” “the biggest devil that God Almighty ever let live,” “an old heifer,” and others of a like opprobrious character; falsely charging her with being “crazy” and “demented,” and threatening to send her [186]to an insane asylum; falsely charging her with being sexually intimate with another man; falsely charging her with having tried to poison him; and on one occasion doing physical injury to her person by seizing her and violently shaking her. It is also averred that being a man of great wealth—all of it being community property—he compelled respondent to live in uncomfortable and unwholesome quarters, and to pay household and family expenses out of a small and inadequate allowance. And it is averred that appellant’s conduct aforesaid caused respondent “extreme mental anguish”; and, also, that this mental suffering, together with physical pain caused by appellant’s said conduct, has injured her health and endangered her life. The findings of the court are, substantially, that all the averments of the complaint above stated are true.
Counsel for appellant have, in their briefs, argued very elaborately and ably that the judgment is wrong and should be reversed. They contend that the evidence does not sustain the findings, and make other points which will be hereafter briefly noticed; but when their arguments are fully analyzed they will be found to rest mainly on the contention that, looking over the whole ease, and even taking the facts testified to by respondent and her witnesses and found by the court to be true, there does not appear such a state of fact as constitutes, in law, “extreme cruelty,” or warrants a divorce upon that ground.
With respect to the sufficiency of the evidence to justify the findings, it is not denied that respondent herself testified very fully to the truth of the material facts found, but it is contended that she was not sufficiently corroborated to meet the requirements of section 130 of the Civil Code. But, in the first place, where the cruelty consists of successive acts of ill-treatment, it is not necessary that there should be direct testimony of other witnesses to every act sworn to by the plaintiff; it is sufficient corroboration if a considerable number of important and material facts are so testified to by other witnesses, or there is other evidence, circumstantial or direct, wdiich strongly tends to strengthen and confirm the statements of the plaintiff. The main purpose of section 130 is to prevent collusion. (See Smith v. Smith, 119 Cal. 183; Evans v. Evans, 41 Cal. 103; Baker v. Baker, 13 Cal. 88.) In the case at bar there was corroboration
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