Lee v. McClelland
Before: Fleet
Synopsis
Vendor and Purchaser—Note for Purchase Monet—Defense of Fraudulent Representations—Matters of Opinion.—Exaggerated and even reckless declarations of a vendor of land or of his agent, which are but expressions of opinion as to the profit to be realized from the venture, whether such opinion be actual or pretended, are not such fraudulent representations as will avoid the contract of sale or which constitute a defense to a note for the purchase money; but in such case the purchaser must exercise his own judgment, and he will rely at his peril upon the expression of the vendor’s opinion.
Ed.—Character of Land—Representations of Agent—Inspection of Land bt Purchaser.—Where the purchaser had a convenient opportunity to inspect the land, and did in fact visit and inspect it, he cannot rely upon the representations of the vendor’s agent as to the character of the land, if it does not appear that the agent in any way intentionally induced such reliance, and it appears that his representations as to the character of the land were in their nature matters of opinion, upon which it was the purchaser’s duty to exercise his own judgment.
Id.—Consent to New Contract—Change of Note—Waiver of Fraud.— Where the representations complained of were all made prior to the original contract of purchase, and the defendant, after taking possession under the contract, failed to make the deferred payment required, and asked for further time and a reduction of interest, and subsequently a. new contract was entered into under reduced terms, and the former note was canceled and a new note executed, without any objection, raised that the purchaser had been wronged or defrauded during the life of the first contract or note, notwithstanding full opportunity to ascertain the character of the land, and having voluntarily entered into a new contract more favorable to him in its terms and secured, at his own solicitation, and without disclosing any ground of objec- • tion to the original contract and note, he must be held to have waived the fraud, if any, -which might have vitiated the first contract andi ■ note.
Id.—Delay in Use on Means to Discover Fraud.—Where the alleged fraud-' ulent representations consisted of statements to the effect that the land was “good orange land,” and the defendant was in possession, and had the means of acquiring knowledge on that subject, it was his duty to do so, as against his right to set up the defense of fraud against his note for the purchase money, and it cannot be successfully urged that he did not discover the worthlessness of the land for that purpose for a period of three years, and until after the second contract and note were executed. Means and opportunity of acquiring knowledge are, in such case, the equivalent of knowledge.
VAN FLEET, J. Action on promissory note indorsed to plaintiff before maturity. The defense was that the note was given to plain tifPs indorser, one TJnruh, as evidence of a deferred payment under an executory contract for the sale of certain land and water stock; that said contract and the note were procured through the fraudulent representations of TJnruh as to the character of the land, and that plaintiff took the note with constructive notice of the fraud. Defendant had judgment, and plaintiff appeals therefrom and from an order denying him a new trial, his principal contention being that the evidence does not warrant the verdict.
It cannot be said that there was no evidence to justify the jury in finding that plaintiff was not an indorsee for value in due course. We think it very strongly tended to show that plaintiff really took and held the note merely for collection.
[149]But we are clearly of the opinion that there was no evidence legally tending to establish the alleged fraud on the part of Unruh; that the only representations as to the character of the land were in their nature mere matters of opinion, and in no sense representations of substantive facts which may be made the basis of fraud, however false they may have been. All that the evidence tended to show in that regard was, in substance, that TJnruh, who was the agent of one Baldwin in subdividing and disposing of some lands of the latter in Los Angeles county, with accompanying water privileges, and who was familiar with the requirements for the successful cultivation of oranges, represented to defendant, who was ignorant of the value ■or character of the land, that he ought to take a piece of the land and put it in oranges; “that it was good orange land; would raise oranges,” and make defendant a living; that it “was first-class ground”—“decomposed granite” or “gravel” and “free from frost.” To sum it up in defendant’s own language: “He said it was fine orange land, and I could put out oranges and go east in the summer and come back and I would get a crop of oranges; and on the strength of that statement I purchased the land.”
It is quite obvious that such statements made by a seller of land, even admittedly to induce a purchase, cannot be made the predicate of false or fraudulent representations such as will avoid a contract of sale. They are the exaggerated, and it may be the reckless, declarations of an eager trader, holding out the golden promise of profit to induce a sale; but after all they are but the expressions of the vendor’s opinion, actual or pretended, upon which the purchaser will rely at his peril. As said in Rendell v. Scott, 70 Cal. 514:
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