Jewell v. Pierce
Before: Harrison
Synopsis
Estates of Deceased Persons—Construction of Will—Decree of Distribution Conclusive—Merger of Will.—A decree of distribution of property under a will involves a judicial construction thereof, and, if not appealed from, is conclusive as to the effect of the will, the provisions of which were merged in the decree, and as to the rights of all heirs, devisees, and legatees claiming any portion of the estate, and they can no longer contend for any different construction of the will from that imported by the terms of the decree.
Id.—Devise in Fee to Grandson—Contingent Devise to Heirs of Testatrix —Death of Grandson without Issue—Construction Fixed by Decree.— Whether a construction might be given to a will devising lands in fee to a grandson, followed by a contingent devise thereof to the heirs of the testatrix, in the event of the grandson “dying without leaving lawful issue him surviving,” so as to refer those words solely to the death of the grandson in the lifetime of the testatrix, cannot be considered or decided, where the decree of distribution distributes the estate to “said grandson, his heirs and assigns forever, and, in event of the death of the said” grandson, “leaving no lawful issue him surviving, then all the property, real and personal, herein distributed to the heirs of the said deceased” testatrix, thereby judicially construing the will as devising to the grandson an estate in fee defeasible upon the contingency of his dying at any time without leaving any lawful issue surviving him, with a remainder in fee to the heirs of the testatrix limited upon this contingency.
In.—Conditional Limitation—Executory Devise—Contingent Remainder —Common Law—Code Provisions.—At common law, such a disposition of property by will would be termed a conditional limitation by way of au executory devise, but under the system prevailing in this state may be denominated a contingent remainder. An executory devise was, at common law, in the nature of a contingent re- . mainder, and could be created only by will; but as a coutingent remainder could not be created upon a fee, a devise, of a fee qualified by a devise over of the same estate to another upon the happening of a contingency or the breach of a condition, was upheld as an executory devise. Under sections 095, 709, 773, and 778 of the Civil Code, a future contingent estate in fee may be limited upon a precedent estate in fee, upon a contingency happening within the period allowed by the code, and may be denominated a contingent remainder, which is to be deemed a conditional limitation of the precedent estate.
Id.—Distribution to Heirs not Named—Collateral Attack—Executory Limitation.—The failure to name the persons and proportions in which an estate is distributed to the heirs of the testator does not render the decree void or subject to collateral attack; and where, at the time of the entry of the decree of distribution, the .event upon which the estate of the heirs -was limited to take effect was uncertain and contingent, and might never happen, and it was impossible for the, court to ascertain the individuals who would constitute the heirs upon the happening of that eveut, the principles applicable to a decree of immediate distribution to persons who may be named and the proportion .to which each may be entitled have no application.
HARRISON, J. The plaintiffs brought this action against the defendants to quiet their title to certain lands, described in the complaint. Sarah C. Pierce died seised of the lands in question Hovember 28, 1891, leaving a last will and testament bearing date November 15, 1884, containing the following provisions:
“2. I give, devise, and bequeath to my grandson, William S, Pierce, his heirs and assigns forever [certain property charged with the payment of certain legacies]; my said grandson, William S. Pierce to come into possession of said property so devised and bequeathed on his reaching the age of twenty-one years.
“3. AH the rest, residue, and remainder of my estate, real and personal, I hereby give, devise, and bequeath to my said grandson, William S. Pierce, his heirs and assigns forever.
“4. In the event of my said grandson, William S. Pierce, dying without leaving lawful issue him surviving, then all the property, real and personal, devised and bequeathed to him by this instrument, I devise and bequeath to my heirs according to the laws of the state of California.”
By a codicil thereto, the testatrix revoked certain of the legacies which she had charged upon the estate bequeathed to her grandson, and made certain changes in others. Her will was admitted to probate, and upon the settlement of the final account of the executors, December 12, 1892, the superior court made a decree of final distribution of her estate, which after reciting therein the provisions of her will, and that WilHam S„ Pierce was at that time upward of twenty-two years of age, and is entitled to the residue “according to the terms of the said will and codicil,” declared as follows:
“It is therefore ordered, adjudged, and decreed that the residue of the said estate be and the same is distributed as follows, to wit: To William S. Pierce, said grandson, his heirs and assigns forever, and, in the event of the death of the said William S. Pierce leaving no lawful issue him surviving, then all the property, real and personal, of deceased herein distributed, [82]to the heirs of the said deceased Sarah 0. Pierce, according to the laws of the state of California.”
William S. Pierce died without issue March 21, 1895, leaving a last will and testament by which he devised his estate to the defendant, Mary J. Pierce, who was also appointed executrix of his will. At the trial of the cause, the plaintiffs, in addition to the foregoing facts, offered evidence tending to show that they are the heirs at law of Sarah C. Pierce, deceased, and at the close of their testimony the court, upon the motion of the defendants, rendered its judgment that plaintiffs take nothing by the action, and dismissed the same. From this judgment the plaintiffs have appealed.
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