Fowler v. Miller
Synopsis
Estates of Deceased Persons—Riqht of Administration—Transfer of Title by Heirs—Improper Revocation of Letters.—The heirs of a deceased person, who died without debts, or other estate, cannot, by consent that there shall be no administration oí real property belonging to the decedent, and by transfer of their title in such real estate, dispense with the rights of administration thereupon; and where letters of administration upon such real property were granted to the public administrator six years after the death of the decedent, the court cannot revoke his letters and set aside the proceeding for administration, because of such agreement and transfer on the part of the heirs, and upon the ground that there was no occasion for administration upon the said estate.
Id.—Statutory Construction—Object of Administration—Probate Pro- ■ ceedings Statutory and Special—Jurisdiction—Improper Dismissal-Rights of Administrator.—The whole subject matter of dealing with the estates of deceased persons is one of statutory regulation, and the policy and intent of the statute is to subject estates of deceased persons to administration, for the purpose of ascertaining and protecting the rights of creditors and heirs and properly transmitting the title of record, and there is no other method of conclusively determining the existence or nonexistence of heirs or creditors; and the proceedings for administration being statutory and special in their nature, the jurisdiction of the superior court over them is circumscribed by the provisions of the statute conferring such jurisdiction, and it cannot competently proceed in a manner essentially different from that provided by statute, nor dispense with further proceedings nor deprive the administrator of his right to compensation and reimbursement of costs and expense of administration by an order setting aside and dismissing the proceedings.
THE COURT. The respondent, Mary F. Fowler, in May, 1896, filed a petition in said estate, the material averments of which were in substance that said decedent died in the state of Washington in 1890, intestate, without any debts, and leaving no estate except a certain described piece of real estate in the county of Sacramento, in this state; that he left as heirs four adult children, all of lawful age, of whom petitioner was one; that by mutual consent of said heirs no administration was taken out upon said estate, but that after the death of said intestate, and before the grant of letters hereinafter mentioned, the others of said heirs conveyed all their right, title, and interest in said property to the petitioner, who took possession and control thereof, and has since occupied the same.
That in March, 1896, W. B. Miller, the appellant, as public-administrator of said county of Sacramento, regularly applied for and was granted letters of administration upon the estate of [665]said deceased, and has since heen proceeding to administer upon said estate; that an inventory and appraisement was filed by said administrator, and thereafter an application was made for an order to sell the said real estate to pay the expenses of administration, which application, after proceedings duly and regularly had therefor, was granted, and an order made for the sale of said property, and that in pursuance of said order the administrator was proceeding to advertise and sell the same, and would make such sale unless restrained by the court. It is then alleged that the petitioner “is informed and verily believes that there was no necessity for administration upon the said estate,” and that the said administrator “has procured the said letters of administration solely and only for the purpose of deriving to himself the fees which may be allowed him by law, and without respect to the interests of said estate, or the interests of your petitioner.” The prayer was that the administrator be required to show cause why his letters and all proceedings thereunder should not be vacated and set aside, and that the contemplated sale be stayed until the final determination of the petition.
The administrator demurred to the petition as stating no cause for relief, which demurrer was overruled and an answer filed, upon which the matter was tried. The court found the facts in all essential respects as alleged in the petition, and, concluding, as matter of law, that there was no occasion for administration upon the said estate, made an omnibus order vacating and setting aside its order appointing the administrator, revoking his letters, setting aside the order of sale of real estate, and generally all other orders and proceedings in the estate, and directing that the administration upon the said estate cease and determine, and awarding costs of the proceeding against the administrator. From this order the appeal is taken.
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