People v. Sears

Criminal Law—Burglary—Evidence—Ownership of Trunk Containing Stolen Property—Previous Burglary and Theft of Trunk—Claim— Possession of Contents.—Upon the trial of a defendant accused of burglary with intent to commit larceny, where there was evidence for the prosecution showing that a burglarious entry had been made into a house by two men, and that a trunk standing in the hall had been rifled by them, and clothing, an album, and jewelry taken therefrom, it was proper for the prosecution to prove, as corroborative evidence, that defendant was the owner of a trunk in which most of the stolen property was found; and even if the record had disclosed that defendant had been prosecuted upon another charge of burglary wherein it was alleged that he had stolen the trunk, it would still be competent to show that he owned or claimed the trunk in question, as furnishing evidence of possession of its contents.

Id.—Sufficiency of Evidence—Alibi—Province of Jury.—Where the evidence for the prosecution showed that the stolen clothing, album, etc., were found in a trunk kept by defendant in a barn owned by another person, and that some of the stolen jewelry was found in his pockets, and that the burglary occurred between 10 and 11 o’clock at night, and there was evidence for the defendant tending to prove that defendant was elsewhere employed until about 11 o’clock on that night, and defendant attempted to account for his possession of the stolen property by saying he was a junk dealer, and that on the next morning he found the goods in a gunny-sack standing against a tree on the corner of two streets, and that he put them in the barn because he was afraid the woman with whom he lived near the barn would take them, the jury was the sole judge as to the guilt or innocence of the defendant, and may have disbelieved the testimony tending to prove an alibi, or that there was a mistake as to the hour when he quit work, or as to the time of the burglary, and their verdict cannot be disturbed upon appeal for insufficiency of the evidence to support it.

Id.—Cross-examination of Defendant—Improper Questions—Harmless Action of Prosecuting Officer—Rulings of Court.—Where some of the questions put to the defendant upon his cross-examination were improper, but were oí little moment, and objections thereto were sustained by the court, and when any of them were answered without objection, the answer was stricken out by the court, and the jury instructed to disregard such testimony, no injury resulted from such improper questions, and a judgment of conviction of the defendant will not be reversed for alleged misconduct of the prosecuting officer in asking them.

Id.—Impeachment of Defendant—Pbevious Conviction of Eelony.—Although it is not proper to show that the defendant was guilty of some other offense, for the purpose of raising a presumption, either of law or fact, of his guilt in the case under consideration, yet, when a defendant offers himself as a witness in his own behalf he may be asked, for the purpose of impeaching his evidence, if he has been convicted of a felony, or the fact, if it exists, may be shown by the record of the judgment.