Wolters v. King
Before: Belcher
Synopsis
Action fob Lumber Sold and Delivered—Sale . of Land for Lumber— Agency for Owner—Contract for Benefit of Lumber Firm—Separate Agreements in One Transaction.—Where a member of a copartnership engaged in the business of buying and selling lands, acting for the benefit of bis firm, and also as agent for the sale of a tract of land, effected a sale of the land in his own name to a corporation engaged in the business of manufacturing lumber near to the land, agreeing that the price fixed should be paid in lumber to be delivered to him at specified rates, and on the same day made a separate agreement with the owner of the land reciting that he had acted as agent of the owner in effecting the sale, and that such owner was to be paid for the lumber by him at the rates specified, each lot delivered to be paid for to the owner at those rates ninety days after delivery, with agreed interest, and that the owner was to sell the lumber to him at those rates, and should pay him a commission for effecting the sale, payable in lumber at the rates fixed, the two agreements are to be considered as parts of one transaction, and as binding the firm for whose benefit they were made, and an action will lie in favor, of the owner of the land against such firm for lumber sold and delivered to them under the agreement.
Id.—Time for Payment of Commission—Contemporaneous Oral Agreement for Postponement—Parol Evidence.—Though, as a general rule, a broker or agent for the sale of land for a stipulated commission has earned and is entitled to his commission when he has found a purchaser able, ready, and willing to take the land at the price and within the time agreed upon, yet where no time for the payment of the commission was definitely agreed upon in the written contract, parol evidence is admissible to show that, contemporaneously with the execution of the written agreement, it was orally agreed between the agent and the owner of the land, that the commission, which was to be paid to the agent on lumber, was not to be taken out of the first lumber delivered to him under the contract, but that he was to wait for payment of the commission until all the lumber had been shipped as agreed in the contract, and the owner had received payment for his land.
In.—Lumbeb Eirm Bound by Obad Agreement—Appropriation of Lumber fob Commission—Insufficient Defense to Action.—Under the circumstances of the case, all of the members of ,the lumber firm were bound by the terms of the agreement made by one of its members for the benefit of the firm, including the oral agreement made respecting the time for payment of the stipulated commission, and none of them can appropriate the lumber first delivered to them under the contract to the immediate payment of the stipulated commission, or defend an action by the owner of the land against them for the agreed price of such lumber, upon the ground of such appropriation.
BELCHER, C. The plaintiff brought this action to recover a sum of money, with interest, alleged to be due for lumber sold and delivered by him to defendants. The answer denied all the averments of the complaint. The court found: “That on the eighth day of November, 1892, the plaintiff, at the instance and request of the defendants, sold and delivered to said defendants lumber of the agreed price and value of one thousand and eighteen dollars and twenty-three cents, for which said defendant's promised and agreed to pay to said plaintiff, ninety days after said date, with interest at the rate of eight per cent per annum from and after the expiration of said ninety days.” Thei court further found that no part of the said money had been paid, and that plaintiff was entitled to a judgment therefor.
Judgment was accordingly so entered, from which and from an order denying their motion for a new trial defendants appeal.
[174]It appears that in November, 1892, plaintiff was the owner of five hundred and twelve acres of timber land in Siskiyou county, which he wished to sell. The defendants were copartners, engaged in the business of buying and selling lumber in the city of San Francisco. The Bed Cross Lumber Company was a corporation engaged in the business of manufacturing lumber near plaintiff’s land, and it wished to purchase said land and pay for it in lumber.
On November 1, 1892, the defendant, M. Harris, in his own name but for the benefit of the firm of Harris & Jones, entered into a written agreement with the Bed Cross Lumber Company, by the terms of which he agreed to sell to the lumber company and said company agreed to buy the plaintiff’s said land. The agreed purchase price was five thousand one hundred and twenty dollars,' payable in lumber to be shipped and delivered to Harris by or before the thirty-first day of December, 1893. The lumber was to be taken in payment according to a schedule fixing different values for different grades of lumber. Hpon delivery by the lumber company of sufficient lumber to maleé up the purchase price of five thousand one hundred and twenty dollars, Harris agreed to execute and deliver to said company a good and sufficient grant, bargain, and sale deed of said land.
On the same day, November 1,1892, the plaintiff Wolters and the defendant Harris entered into a second written agreement, which, after setting out the substance of the agreement between Harris and the lumber company, and that the title to the lands described therein was actually vested in said Wolters, and that Harris, in contracting for the sale thereof, acted as Wolters’ agent, contained the following provisions: 1. That Harris should receive the lumber shipped to him by the Bed Cross Lumber. Company and pay Wolters for it at the rates mentioned in the agreement between him and the said company; 2. That Wolters should pay Harris the sura of one thousand and twenty four dollars as a commission for making the sale of the land; 3. That Wolters would sell to Harris all the lumber mentioned or referred to in the agreements at the rates specified therein, and that payment for any shipment made should not be due until the. expiration of ninety days after the delivery thereof to Harris in San Francisco, and that upon all payments not made at.
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