Buck v. City of Eureka

TEMPLE, J. This is an appeal by the plaintiff from the judgment and also from the order modifying such judgment. It is the second appeal in the case. (See Buck v. City of Eureka, 109 Cal. 504.) In pursuance of the permission given by this court in the judgment rendered in the former appeal, plaintiff filed his second amended complaint seeking compensation upon a quantum meruit for services rendered after his term of office had expired.

The defendant answered this amended complaint, and upon the trial plaintiff recovered a verdict for four thousand seven hundred dollars, for which amount judgment was entered. Soon after the entry of the judgment the court ordered it to be modified so as to express on its face that it was to be paid only out of the city revenues of certain years, then long past, and which revenues had presumably been entirely exhausted years before the judgment was rendered. This modification was made by the court upon the idea that it was required by section 18, article XT, of the constitution, which provides that “no city shall incur indebtedness or liability in any manner, or for any purpose, exceeding in any year the income and revenue provided for it for such year,” etc. It is also contended that the form of [45]the judgment is in accord with the decision of this court in Weaver v. San Francisco, 111 Cal. 327, and in Smith v. Broderick, 107 Cal. 644; 48 Am. St. Rep. 167.

The question as to the form of the judgment was recently before this court in Higgins v. San Diego, 118 Cal. 524. In that case, a majority of this court held that in such case the plaintiff was entitled—if he recovered—to an ordinary general judgment, which judgment could not, however, be paid out of the ordinary revenue of any year subsequent to the year in which the liability was incurred. According to that ruling, the qualification added to the judgment by the order appealed from must be stricken out.

It may be doubted, however, whether such a modification will be of any value to the appellant, and he submits and contends that this claim Is one of those that may be lawfully paid from the ordinary revenues of a succeeding year. It is argued that the debt due plaintiff was necessarily contracted to meet an emergency which the municipal authorities could not have anticipated, and, therefore, could not have provided a revenue for; nor could they have taken the necessity for such expenditure into consideration when contracting liabilities chargeable upon the revenues of that year. The city was sued to recover damages for injuries caused by a mob. The demand exceeded the income of the city for the year. The authorities, it is said, must defend or allow the city to become'bankrupt. It could not have been intended to deprive the city of the power to protect itself against ruin.