Santa Rosa Lighting Co. v. Woodward

California Supreme Court Nov 6, 1897 No. S. F. No. 598Published

Before: Chipman

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Holding. The court held that a city council, having determined that its streets should be lighted, is legally required under the Act of 1895 to advertise for bids and let a contract for such services, and cannot evade this duty through temporary, day-to-day arrangements.

Issues

Whether a city council that has determined to light its streets is mandated by the Act of 1895 to advertise for bids and enter into a contract.
Whether a taxpayer must show specific pecuniary damage to compel a municipal body to comply with a statutory duty.
Whether the council's practice of day-to-day lighting arrangements constitutes a valid alternative to the statutory requirement of competitive bidding.

Disposition. reversed

Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion

“The object and intention of the act of 1895 are too plain for doubt. It was designed to secure to the citizens and tax payers of cities and towns the advantage of open competition and to secure the service at the lowest price”

“I do not believe that the law can be evaded by simply employing some person or corporation from day to day to perform the service. A construction of the law that would allow this to be done would nullify the object of its enactment.”

Synopsis

Municipal Corporations—Lighting Streets—Letting Contract—Demand on City Council.—The city council or boards of trustees of municipalities are charged with notice of the act of March 26, 1895, requiring the letting of contracts for lighting public streets, and it is not necessary for a party seeking to compel them to comply with the requirements of that act to embody in his formal demand all its provisions or to specifically point out the steps demanded to be taken. It is sufficient, so far as the demand is concerned, to make it upon the council.

Id.—Discretion as to Lighting Streets—Mandamus to Compel Advertisement for Bids.—The courts will not compel a city council to exercise its discretion as to whether the streets of its municipality should or should not be lighted; hut where its past and present official conduct unmistakably show that it has determined that the city should he lighted by electricity, and there is no valid binding contract standing in the way of proceeding under the act of 1895, a writ of mandate will lie at the instance of a taxpayer to compel it to advertise for bids for such lighting, as required by that act, without any showing by him of actual pecuniary damage. It will be presumed that the disregard by the council of the requirements of the statute is injurious.

CHIPMAN, C. On November 19, 1895, the judge of the superior court of Sonoma county issued the alternative writ of the court directed to the defendants, the common council of the city of Santa Rosa, commanding them to advertise, as required by law, for bids for the lighting of the streets and public buildings and other public places of said city, and to show cause why a. peremptory writ of mandate should not issue requiring them so to act.

A demurrer to the original petition was sustained and ten days [31]given to amend, and in the mean time the alternative writ was continued in force.

A verified, amended petition was filed and a verified answer was filed. The cause was tried by the court, and judgment went for defendants dismissing the writ. Plaintiff appeals from the judgment and from the order denying its motion for a new trial.

It is sought to compel the defendants to advertise for sealed proposals for lighting the city and to let a contract under such advertisement. The action is brought under an act approved March 26, 1895 (Stats. 1895, p. 191), section 1. The act provides that “before any city .... shall enter into any contract for the lighting of its streets .... the city council .... shall advertise for bids for such lighting,” etc. Section 2 provides that “all contracts .... shall be let to the lowest bidder,” the city reserving the right to reject all bids. Section 3 provides how the bids are to be submitted, and that when a bid is accepted the city shall enter into a contract embodying the specifications, etc., “but no contract shall be made for a longer period than one year .... and shall go into effect within six months after the bid is approved.” Respondents contend that, while injunction might lie if the council was lighting the streets since the act of 1895, without a contract, appellant has not shown any defined legal right in itself nor a corresponding duty devolved upon the council which they have refused to perform; that there must be a specific act specifically demanded of defendants, and that no such demand is alleged or proven. The sixth finding of fact is: “That plaintiff, since the third day of July, 1894, prior to commencing the suit, requested defendants to proceed and let a contract for lighting the streets of the city of Santa Rosa, but did not demand that said council proceed in any specified manner, and did not specify what acts defendants should perform in connection with the letting of said contract. That defendants did refuse to comply with plaintiff’s said request, and have not since the third day of July made any contracts for lighting said streets.” Finding XIV is: “That the plaintiff subsequently to July 31, 1894, and after the twenty-sixth day of March, 1895, demanded of said common council and of the members thereof that they have the lighting of the streets and other public places

Santa Rosa Lighting Co. v. Woodward

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