Board of Education v. Grant
Before: Bank, Beatty, From, Hearing
Synopsis
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of the City and County of San Francisco, upon submission of a controversy ■without action. J. M. Seawell, Judge.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.
The buildings in question are parts of the realty. (Civ. Code, secs. 658,660.) The board of supervisors had no power to provide that title to such buildings should remain in the lessee, it not having been conferred upon them by the statute. (Zottman v. San Francisco, 20 Cal. 102; 81 Am. Dec. 96; French v. Tesche-malcer, 24 Cal. 550; Nicolson etc. Go. v. Painter, 35 Cal. 699 McQoy v. Briant, 58 Cal. 250; Smith v. Morse, 2 Cal. 538-39; Grogan v. San Francisco, 18 Cal. 609; Heno v. San Francisco, 33 Cal. 143; Payne v. Treadwell, 16 Cal. 234; People v. McClin-toclc, 45 Cal. 11.) The lease was the final expression of the agreement of the parties, and superseded all previous negotiations. (West Coast Lumber Co. v. Apfield, 86 Cal. 335-40; Hallett v. Wylie, 3 Johns. 44; 3 Am. Dec. 457; Jackson v. Clark, 3 Johns. 424; Jackson v. Meyers, 2 Johns. 388; 3 Am. Dec. 504; Kabley v. Worcester Gas Light Co., 102 Mass. 394; Mayer v. Mc-Creery, 119 N. Y. 434, 439-41; Abbott v. ’76 Land & Water Co:, 101 Cal. 567, 570.)
A municipal corporation has powers fairly implied in or incident to the powers expressly granted. (1 Dillon on Municipal Corporations, sec. 89; 15 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, 1041.) The lease became operative as to its terms when the bids made upon the terms proposed in the advertisement were accepted; and the lease is not in conflict with the previous contract, and cannot affect the rights of the tenants to their improvements thereunder. (Sivers v. Sivers, 97 Cal. 518; San Francisco v. McGinn, 67 Cal. 110; People v. Board of Supervisors, 27 Cal. 678.) The board and not the mayor was authorized to make the contract, and its award of the lease constituted the contract. It could not delegate its power to contract to the mayor. (15 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, 1043; Meuser v. Risdon, 36 Cal. 239; 95 Am. Dec. 181.) Proof is admissible of any collateral agreement which does not interfere with the terms of the written contract. (Barshor v. Forbes, 36 Md. 166; Guidery v. Green, 95 Cal. 635; Chapin v. Dobson, 34 Am. Rep. 512; Powelton etc. Co. v. McShain, 75 Pa. St. 238; 17 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, 443.)
THE COURT. This is an agreed case submitted to the superior court of the city and county of San Francisco, under sections 1138, et seq., of the Code of Civil Procedure. The contest is between the board of education of said city and county, who is appellant here, and John Grant and a number of other persons who are here respondents. Judgment was rendered in the court below for the respondents, and the board of education [41]appeals. Tbe controversy is as to tbe ownership of certain permanent buildings erected by tbe respondents upon certain school lots owned by tbe appellant.
Tbe legislature, by an act approved March 30, 1874, authorized tbe board of supervisors of said city and county to lease for a term of twenty years certain parts of a one hundred vara school lot (No. 128), on the southwest comer of Market and Fifth streets, in said city and county. Tn pursuance of the authority granted by said act the board caused the land authorized to be leased to be surveyed and divided into eleven lots,i each being twenty-five feet front, and executed leases to the respondents or their predecessors in interest—all the leases being substantially similar, and each being of one or more of the subdivisions of said land. The leases were for twenty years, and were executed by the board through the mayor, he having been authorized by the board to execute the leases. During the term of the leases the respective lessees excavated the soil of the lots “to an average depth of nine feet, and upon and in said soil so excavated built and laid brick foundation walls imbedded in the soil, and upon said foundation walls erected buildings, all of said buildings except the building erected on said lot No. 3 being frame, wooden buildings, four stories in height above the basement, and the building so erected upon said lot No. 3 being a brick building, three stories in height above the basement.” All of the buildings remained on the land until after the expiration of the leases, and axe still on said land. These buildings are, therefore, under both common and statutory law, part of the realty, and belong to the owner of the land in the absence of any covenant in the leases providing otherwise. And in neither of the leases involved here is there any covenant or provision that the tenants might remove the buildings. It is clear, therefore, that under the leases in question the buildings in controversy belonged at the expiration of the terms of said leases to the appellant, the board of education.
The respondents endeavor to avoid this apparently inevitable conclusion by contending that the leases are to be considered as changed or modified by a certain advertisement made by the board of supervisors for proposals to lease said lots, which contained the following: “All improvements on said lots, unless
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