People v. Hill
Before: Fleet
Synopsis
Criminal Law—Homicide—Defense of Insanity—Expert Evidence— Rebuttal.—Where, upon the trial of a defendant accused of the murder of his wife, the defendant offered evidence tending to prove the defense of insanity, and the prosecution, to rehut the inference of insanity, offered the expert evidence of a physician, who, in response to a hypothetical question, gave it as his opinion that defendant was sane at the time of the homicide, such opinion is not new matter, hut simply matter in contradiction of defendant’s evidence, and the defendant is not entitled to offer in rebuttal the opinion of another expert to the contrary, such evidence being properly part of defendant’s evidence in chief.
Id.—Hypothetical Question to Expert—Theory of Questioning Party —Statement of Evidence—Cross-examination—Question for Jury. It is not necessary, in framing a hypothetical question put to an expert for his opinion, to include a statement of all the evidence in the case, but the question may be framed upon any theory of the questioning party which can be deduced from the evidence, and the statement may assume any facts within the limits of the evidence, upon which the opinion of the expert is desired, and may omit any facts not deemed by the questioner material to the inquiry; and where the theory of the prosecution in questioning an expert witness upon direct examination, does not accord with the theory of the defendant, he may upon cross-examination, put hypothetical questions to the witness framed upon his theory of the evidence, and take his opinion thereon, leaving to the jury the question as to which theory, if either, was warranted by the evidence.
Id__Murder of Wife—Evidence of Unchaste Conduct—Knowledge of Defendant.—Upon the trial of a defendant accused of the murder of his wife, evidence of her unchaste conduct is not admissible, unless proved to have been communicated to the defendant before the homicide.
Id.—Anonymous Letters—Conversation with Defendant.—The defendant cannot prove statements made by him to another person in regard to anonymous letters received by him relating to the conduct of his wife.
Id.—Opinion Evidence—Probable Position of Deceased when Shot was Fired—Harmless Error.—The probable position of the person of the deceased toward defendant when the fatal shot was fired, is not a proper subject of expert testimony, or opinion evidence, hut the error in allowing such evidence is harmless, where no question is made as to the killing of the deceased by the defendant by shooting her with a pistol, and the jury could not have been prejudiced thereby.
Id.—Right of Jurors to Disagree — Unnecessary Instruction.—The right of any juror to refuse to concur in any verdict unsatisfactory to him, is matter of such common or universal knowledge, that it is not error to refuse to instruct the jurors as to such right at the request of the defendant.
Van Fleet, J. Defendant was convicted of murder of the first degree in the killing of his wife, Agnes Hill, and adjudged to suffer death. He appeals from the judgment and an order denying him a new trial, the exceptions urged all being based upon rulings at the trial.
1. To support the defense of insanity relied on by defendant, he introduced evidence tending to ■ show certain peculiarities of temperament, disposition, and conduct in his father and in himself, from which an inference might have been drawn of a want of perfect mental balance in defendant at times. The prosecution did not attempt to controvert the facts thus shown, but, to rebut the inference of insanity therefrom, called Dr. Robertson as an expert on mental diseases, who, in response to a hypothetical statement of the facts, gave, as his opinion, that defendant was sane at the time of the commission of the act. Thereupon, defendant desired to introduce the opinion of a physician on his behalf in rebuttal of the opinion expressed by Dr. Robertson. The court refused to permit such evidence as rebuttal, on the ground that it was properly a part of defendant’s case in chief, but offered to permit defendant to reopen his case for the purpose of putting in such evidence if he so desired. This offer was declined, and the [566]refusal to admit the evidence as rebuttal is now assigned as error.
The defendant was entitled to rebut any new matter offered on the subject by the people, but the evidence of the expert involved nothing new. It was purely evidence in contradiction of defendant’s evidence, and nothing more. Its purpose and effect was, instead of denying the facts shown by defendant, to rebut by a perfectly proper method the inference sought to be drawn therefrom. It was only the method of meeting defendant’s evidence, and not the matter which was new or different; no new fact was shown, and there was nothing, therefore, which was the proper subject of rebuttal. If defendant desired the opinions of experts to support the facts as to his state of mind, such evidence was a part of his original case.
2. Defendant objected to the hypothetical question put to Dr. Robertson, on the ground that it did not embrace a statement of all the evidence, and that it misstated that which it did embrace.
It is not necessary in framing a hypothetical question to include a statement of all the evidence in the case upon the subject of inquiry'. While the question should have for its basis some probable, or at least possible, theory to be deduced from the evidence in the case, counsel have a right to frame the question to accord with their theory of what the material facts are as shown by that evidence, and in so doing may omit facts which from their point of view have no material bearing upon the subject. As stated by Mr. Thompson: “ The hypothetical questions must be based either upon the hypothesis of the truth of all the evidence, or upon a hypothesis specially framed of certain facts assumed to be proved for the purpose of the inquiry. Such questions leave it for the jury to decide in the first case whether the evidence is true or not, and in the second case whether the peculiar facts assumed are or are not proved.” (Thompson on Trials, sec. 604.)
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