Grant v. Murphy
Before: McFarland
Synopsis
Partition—Interlocutory Decree—Sale—Interest of Deceased Co-tenant—Contest of Heirs in Probate Court.—As a general rule, all the parties in an action for partition are actors, and each party may set up in his pleadings his interest in the premises and have it ascertained and adjudicated, and such adjudication must appear in the interlocutory decree, in order to its validity, whether there is to he a strict partition, or the case is one where the premises cannot be divided and must be sold; but where the heirs of a deceased cotenant are contesting his estate in the probate court, which cannot be ousted of jurisdiction of such contest, and the interest of the deceased cotenant has been definitely ascertained, and the premises must be sold in order to effect a just division, it is proper to make a decree of sale, leaving the rights of the contesting claimants to be determined in the court having jurisdiction thereof, and such decree is warranted by the general law of partition, and not violative of any provision of the code.
Id.—Construction of Code— Jurisdiction—Determination of Hostile Claims.—Sections 759 and 774 of the Code of Civil Procedure, so far as applying to the determination by the court of questions of title, as between hostile claimants to any share or parcel, or to the proceeds of the sale thereof, are to be construed as limited to the determination of issues over which the court in which the partition proceedings are pending has jurisdiction, and not as applicable to the determination of hostile claims to the estate of a deceased cotenant, over which the probate court has exclusive jurisdiction.
Decisions—General Expressions—Limitation to Pacts and Questions Involved.—General expressions employed in the decision of a particular case are to be taken as pertinent to the facts then before the court and the questions there involved, and not as applicable to and determinative of a question not then in contemplation.
McFarland, J. This is an appeal from an interlocutory decree in a suit for partition. The point made by the appellants is that the decree does not determine the interest of all the various parties in the premises, and that for this reason it is invalid and should be reversed.
The facts found by the court, and admitted by the parties, which are necessary to be noticed, are these: The premises consist of a city lot in San Francisco, upon which there is a large business building; and it is found by the court, and admitted, that it cannot be divided, but must be sold. On the third day of June, 1885, the owners of the premises were Adam Grant and Daniel T. Murphy, each owning an undivided half as tenant in common with the other. On that day the said Daniel T. Murphy died, leaving a will; and afterward his half of the property was distributed by the proper probate court, as follows: One-half thereof, or six twenty-fourths of the whole property, to his widow, Anna L. Murphy, and one twenty-fourth to each of his six children, Eugene K. L. Murphy, Daniel T. Murphy, Samuel J. Murphy, Mary Helen Murphy (now Mary Helen Dominguez), Frances Josephine Murphy, and Mary Margaret Isabella [429]Murphy. There was also another daughter, Anna Wolseley (formerly Anna Murphy), to whom nothing "was given by the will of said deceased. Daniel T. Murphy and Samuel J. Murphy each afterward conveyed his one twenty-fourth to the plaintiff herein, so that at the time of the decree the plaintiff was the owner of fourteen twenty-fourths of the premises. Afterward the widow, Anna L. Murphy, died, leaving a will by which it is claimed by some of the parties that she devised her six twenty-fourths to her three daughters, the aforesaid Mary Helen Dominguez, Frances Josephine, and Mary Margaret Isabella. This will was admitted to probate in the superior court of Alameda county, but it was afterward contested by the brothers and said Anna Wolseley, and the probate thereof was set aside by the court. But, upon appeal, the judgment of the said superior court was reversed in this court, and judgment ordered admitting the said will to probate. After the remittitur went down, however, another appeal was taken, which is still pending. The said three daughters of Anna L. Murphy, deceased, who claim under her will as aforesaid, set up in their answers that each of them, in addition to the ownership of one twenty-fourth part of the premises, is also entitled to an undivided one-third of the one-fourth of said lands held by their said mother. The defendant, Victor II. Metcalf, who is the administrator of the estate of said Anna L. Murphy, deceased, set up in his answer that the estate was the owner of the undivided one-fourth of said premises. The said Anna Wolseley, Daniel T. Murphy, and Samuel J. Murphy filed answers in which they denied the validity of the said will of their mother, Anna L. Murphy, and set up that each is entitled to an undivided one-seventh of the undivided one-fourth of said premises, which belonged to their mother at the time of her death.
More from California Supreme Court
- People v. Wende (1979)
- People v. Watson (1956)
- People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996)
- People v. Kelly (2006)
- Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962)
- Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001)
- People v. Lewis (2021)
- In Re Estrada (1965)
- Denham v. Superior Court (1970)
- People v. Marsden (1970)